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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON INVESTMENTS
The first chapter studies mutual funds. I model intraquarter trading and use a ge-
netic algorithm to estimate the trade pattern that is most consistent with the fund’s
daily reported returns. I validate the model empirically on a sample of institutional
trades from Ancerno and I confirm that the method more accurately predicts daily
holdings when compared to existing na¨ıve assumptions. Further, my method is sub-
stantially more accurate in classifying a fund’s tendency to supply liquidity, and this
increased precision has important implications for identifying superior performing
funds. Specifically, a long-short strategy based on the model’s liquidity provision
measures earns significant abnormal returns, while a similar strategy that relies on
quarterly holdings does not exhibit any outperformance. The second chapter studies
investment research. We find evidence that crowdsourced investment research facil-
itates informed trading by retail investors and improves firm liquidity. Specifically,
retail order imbalances are strongly correlated with the sentiment of Seeking Alpha
articles, and the ability of retail order imbalances to predict returns is roughly twice as
large on research article days. In addition, firms with exogenous reductions in Seeking
Alpha coverage experience increases in bid-ask spreads and price impact, with the
effect being stronger for firms with high retail ownership. Our findings suggest that
technological innovations have helped democratize access to investment research with
important implications for firm liquidity.
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Chapter 1 Read Between the Filings: Daily Mutual Fund Holdings and
Liquidity Provision
1.1 Introduction
Mutual funds are required to report their equity holdings at a quarterly interval.
These filings have provided both investors and researchers with an invaluable source
of information. However, due to the quarterly frequency, it is not possible to know
the exact timing of their trades. As a result, it remains a challenge to address many
important questions. For example, does the fund tend to demand or supply liquidity?
Does the fund make informed trades over short-horizons or around major information
events (e.g., earnings announcements)? Does the fund engage in window dressing or
portfolio pumping at the end of each quarter?
In order to study intra-quarter activity, many researchers have either made admit-
tedly na¨ıve assumptions about the timing of trades based on filings, or have abstracted
from the stock level in favor of the fund’s observable daily returns. The main ad-
vantage at the stock level is that analysis reflects actual trades that are observed in
the quarterly filings; this creates a trade-off in the lack of precision when measuring
trade timing and adds noise to any derived style measures since market conditions
change throughout the quarter. Analysis at the level of fund returns has the potential
to capture additional features of trading style related to timing, but suffers from an
imprecise measure of actual trading.
Researchers have also made use of alternative datasets, such as Ancerno Ltd., in
order to measure precise actions of funds. While addressing the timing of intraquar-
ter trades, these data have several drawbacks relating to their limited coverage of
funds as well as the restriction of analysis to the fund family instead of the individ-
ual mutual funds. Similarly, studies such as Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz
(2009) and Ha and Hu (2017) have used Trade and Quote (TAQ) data to infer daily
institutional trading. Such approaches captures time-sensitive characteristics of in-
stitutional trades in the overall market but are unable to isolate the measurement to
any given fund.
I use both the fund’s holdings and daily returns data to develop a holdings measure
for the days in between quarterly filings. The main assumption of the method is that
the fund’s daily returns must reflect the returns of its underlying holdings. Since
all non-roundtrip equity trades are observable at the quarterly level, I estimate their
precise timing by modeling and comparing a large number of possible trade sequences
and select the pattern that is most consistent with the fund’s daily returns. I rely
on the fact that stocks trade in discrete quantities (i.e. stocks trade in units and
not at infinitesimal increments). I assume that the portfolio allocation at the start
of the quarter changes toward that of quarter end in discrete steps. Specifically,
I assume that the manager breaks up each quarterly trade into a finite number of
pieces and trades each piece on a distinct day. This creates a large combinatorial
problem where many possible trade combinations exist. To compare combinations,
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I reconstruct the daily returns of the fund’s portfolio under the hypothetical trade
pattern. Absent significant inflows, purchases must be funded by sales. I therefore
constrain the fund’s implied daily flows from trading in order to eliminate unfeasible
trade patterns. Using the genetic algorithm, I select the trade sequence that most
closely replicates the fund’s daily returns under the model’s constraints.
As an example, consider a hypothetical portfolio invested entirely in stock A at
the start of the quarter, and entirely in stock B by the end. Assuming that no other
stocks are transacted, the portfolio return on any given day is the sum of the returns
to each stock multiplied by their respective weights: Rp,t = wA,t×RA,t +wB,t×RB,t.
While there are few legal restrictions that prevent a manager from buying and selling
back and forth between stocks A and B, this is largely limited by trading costs.
I therefore assume that each holding changes monotonically within the quarter.1
If the initial holdings in A were 100 shares, and the ultimate holdings in B were
40 shares, I could break the sale of A into 100 pieces and the purchase of B into
40; the pieces can trade simultaneously. I could label each share in the portfolio:
A1, A2, ..., A100, B1, B2, ..., B40. If there are 60 trading days in the portfolio, there are
60 possible days when stock A1 could be sold. Considering stocks A1 and A2, there
are 602 possible combinations. For the entire portfolio over the quarter, there are
60140 possible combinations. Of course, many of these combinations are redundant
since A1 and A2 are identical. Given the high computational demands that this
presents, I simplify the problem by assuming that each quarterly trade is split into
only four equal pieces: each piece of A is 25 shares and each piece of B is 10 shares.
This reduces the number of possible combinations in this example to 608. Since the
trade sequences create different portfolios through time, the sequences imply different
portfolio returns on each day. I assume that the trade sequence that best reproduces
the fund’s daily returns is the most likely representation of the fund’s actual trade
pattern. To identify this sequence, I use the genetic algorithm to efficiently search
the set of hypothetical trade sequences and select the one with the closest fit on the
fund’s daily returns.2
I validate the method empirically using a sample of institutional trades from AN-
cerno Ltd. Specifically, I infer holdings at quarterly intervals and apply the method
to compare the observable daily fund holdings with those estimated from the model.
Compared to the the standard assumption of end-of-quarter trades, the method re-
duces the mean squared error (MSE) of dollar-weighted daily holdings by 73%.
As an application, I use the model to estimate the fund’s tendency to supply
liquidity. In this context, liquidity provision is the trading against short-term mis-
pricing from non-fundamental pressure (Nagel, 2012). The liquidity supplier provides
immediacy at favorable prices and realizes a profit as prices later reverse. Given the
1Given the low dimensionality of this example, the daily trades could be solved analytically through
a system of equations. For large portfolios, the system would eventually become underdetermined
and the method would fail. By forcing trades to take place in discrete quantities, a solution can be
found.
2Given that the four pieces of a given quarterly trade are identical, there are several sequences that
will produce identical holdings and return patterns by symmetry. I accept the pattern selected by
the algorithm, which is an approximation and involves a stochastic process.
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importance of timing, this trading style is difficult to estimate with low frequency
data. Jame (2018) develops a measure of the fund’s tendency to supply liquidity
based on short-term momentum trading and finds that this predicts future returns
among hedge funds. Using observable daily trades, I replicate the momentum mea-
sure of Jame (2018) within the Ancerno sample and examine how well it can be
approximated using the algorithm-estimated trades. Compared to the benchmarks of
quarter-end trading and uniform trading across the quarter, the algorithm-estimated
trades yield a significantly stronger approximation of the liquidity provision measure.
After establishing validity within Ancerno, I extend my analysis to the broad
sample of mutual funds. I estimate the holdings in between filings, which are un-
observable given current disclosure requirements. I then replicate the trade-based
liquidity provision measure of Jame (2018) using the estimated intra-quarter trades.
The main finding is that liquidity provision is a strong predictor of future fund per-
formance. A portfolio long funds in the bottom quintile and short funds in the top
quintile of momentum over the past two quarters produces an annualized abnormal
return of 1.9%. This finding is robust to the inclusion of the traded liquidity pro-
vision factor of Rinne and Suominen (2014), indicating that the measure provides
incremental information in the classification of the fund’s liquidity demand.
This paper makes two contributions to the finance literature. First, I develop a
measure of daily holdings using the quarterly holdings and daily returns data that is
widely available to academic researchers. I show that this is a more accurate approx-
imation of the fund’s intraquarter trading than existing alternatives. My method can
be applied towards additional topics that require shorter frequency trade data among
mutual funds. Second, by estimating trades at a daily level, I measure the fund’s ten-
dency to trade against short term price reversals. I show that this measure predicts
future fund performance. This compliments a growing literature that links liquidity
provision with fund performance (Franzoni and Plazzi, 2013; Jame, 2018; Rinne and
Suominen, 2014). Finally, I show that the relation between liquidity provision and
future returns is not anticipated by investors in the form of flows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the method for
estimating intraquarter holdings and trading. In Section 3, I validate the model
using the Ancerno sample of institutional trades. Section 4 applies the methodology
to available sample of US active mutual funds. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Intraquarter Holdings
Traditional methods of analyzing mutual fund trading have relied on measures
derived from holdings and returns data separately. Holdings measures directly reflect
portfolio holdings and are better at capturing investment styles (Daniel, Grinblatt,
Titman, and Wermers, 1997). On the other hand, meaningful activity takes place in
between filings, producing a persistent “return gap” Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng
(2006). To examine additional aspects of trading, albeit without the precision of
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holdings data, many studies have relied solely on returns data (Carhart, 1997; Fama
and French, 2010).
In this section, I develop an approach to estimate the fund’s daily holdings using
daily returns data for both the underlying holdings and the fund itself. As a starting
point, Kacperczyk et al. (2006) approach these data jointly in their “return gap”
measure. Specifically, they consider the returns to a hypothetical portfolio that holds
the fund’s initial holdings without trading and compare its returns to the those of the
actual fund. My method attempts to reproduce the fund’s daily returns by selecting
the timing of the trades that are observed in quarterly filings. Since the fund’s
daily returns must reflect their underlying holdings, the trading pattern that best
reproduces its returns is likely an informative estimate of daily holdings.
1.2.2 Model Assumptions
If the fund’s holdings were known throughout the quarter, its daily returns could be
closely inferred from the underlying security prices. Instead, the holdings are revealed
only at quarter-end and the interim portfolio composition is unobservable. Depending
on one’s assumptions, there could exist an infinite set of possible trade sequences
available to a fund manager that would, ex-post, produce identical portfolios observed
in the quarterly filings. With zero trading costs and fractional share holdings, it would
be possible to take on any imaginable portfolio allocation at any point within the
quarter and then fall upon a particular allocation at the time of disclosure. This has
posed a challenge for the study of mutual funds, resulting in a “black-box” approach
to intraquarter holdings.
In order to create a tractable problem, I put forward three assumptions of in-
traquarter trading that bound the relevant set of possible actions available to the
manager: (1) shares trade in discrete quantities, (2) the incremental effect of round-
trip trades is uncorrelated with portfolio returns, and (3) all trades take place at the
day’s closing price. Assumption (1) is true since shares are typically traded in units
greater than 1. Assumptions (2) and (3) may not be absolutely true, but serve as
reasonable approximations. For instance, the majority of institutional trading takes
place at the end of the trading day (Corrie Driebusch, 2018); for this reason I assume
all trades are executed at the day’s closing price. Of course, the degree to which these
assumptions deviate from reality will impact the accuracy of the model’s predictions.
This is an empirical question, which I address later in this paper.
Assumptions (1) and (2) dramatically reduce the possible holdings that the fund
can take on within the quarter. Given discrete trades and by neglecting round trip
trades, the holdings are assumed to move monotonically in discrete steps over the
quarter. Assumption (3) specifies the execution prices and ties the daily holdings
to the daily returns of the fund. Taken together, the three assumptions reduce the
problem to a finite set of possible trades sequences that can be compared objectively
to one another based on how well they reproduce the fund’s daily returns.
To formalize this problem, I consider the returns to the fund’s portfolio on any
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given day:
Rt,F =
N∑
i=1
Ri,t × wi,t, (1.1)
where Rt,F is the fund return on day t; Ri,t and wi,t are the returns and weights to
each stock i on day t. Since I assume that all trades takes place at the end of the
day, the portfolio weights are determined by the holdings on the previous day:
wit =
Si,t−1 × Pi,t−1∑N
i=1 Si,t−1 × Pi,t−1
, (1.2)
where Si,t−1 and Pi,t−1 represent the number of shares held and the closing price of a
given stock on day t-1. On any given day, Si,t is equal to the number of shares held
at the start of the quarter, plus the cumulative share purchases from days 0 to t:
Si,t = Si,0 +
t∑
d=1
∆Si,d (1.3)
Combining equations (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3), the fund’s return on a given day can be
approximated by:
Rt,F ≈
N∑
i=1
Ri,t ×
(
Si,0 +
∑t−1
d=1 ∆Si,d
)× Pi,t−1∑N
i=1
(
Si,0 +
∑t−1
d=1 ∆Si,d × Pi,t−1
) = Rt,M . (1.4)
Rt,M is the return to the modeled portfolio on day t. I rely on my prior assumptions
in order to put restrictions on ∆Si,d. First, I restrict the number of shares traded to
be integers less than or equal to the total number of shares traded within the quarter,
∆Si:
∆Si,d ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . ,∆Si}, (1.5)
and
∆Si = Si,T − Si,0, (1.6)
where subscripts 0 and T designate the start and end dates of the quarterly holding
period. Next, for each stock, the total of daily trades must equal the difference in
trades observed in the filings:
∆Si =
T∑
d=1
∆Si,d (1.7)
The assumption that round-trip trades can be ignored implies that the modeled trades
will move the holdings of a given stock monotonically throughout the quarter. This
further implies that for each stock, the absolute value of the total shares traded equals
the sum of the absolute value of each daily trade:
|∆Si| =
T∑
d=1
|∆Si,d|. (1.8)
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The objective is to select the trade sequence most consistent with the available
data and the model assumptions. I formulate an optimization problem where the
difference between the modeled and the true fund returns are minimized throughout
the quarter. Specifically, I minimize the sum of the squared deviations of the modeled
and true portfolios by selecting different values of each ∆Si,d:
min
S1,1...SN,T
T∑
t=1
(
Rt,F −
N∑
i=1
Ri,t ×
(
Si,0 +
∑t−1
d=1 ∆Si,d
)× Pi,t−1∑N
i=1
(
Si,0 +
∑t−1
d=1 ∆Si,d
)× Pi,t−1
)2
(1.9)
subject to the constraints described in equations (1.5) and (1.8).
An analytical approach to this minimization problem is not possible: the objective
function itself does not have a unique minimum without simultaneously considering
the two constraints. Instead, this can be approached as a combinatorial optimization
problem: I select the best sequence among the finite set of possible alternatives.
1.2.3 Selecting the Optimal Trade Sequence
The minimization problem requires the selection of the trading sequence that min-
imizes the sum of squared differences between the modeled and the true portfolio’s
daily returns. Given the constraints, there exists a finite set of sequences, however
this set is very large. Consider an additional simplification that the fund trades each
stock only once throughout the quarter. This effectively forces all but one ∆Si,d for
each stock equal to zero, with a single value of ∆Si,d set to ∆Si. This reduces the
dimensionality of the problem substantially. Instead of having N × T decision vari-
ables, we are left with N choices: one for each stock in the portfolio. Furthermore, we
can reformulate the choice variable, not as the value of ∆Si,d on any given day, but
instead select which day in the quarter, ki, the holdings of a given stock move from
Si,0 to Si,T . With this assumption, I redefine the value of each Si,ki,t as a function of
S0, S1, t, and choice variable ki:
Si,k,t =
{
Si,0 t < ki
Si,T t ≥ ki
ki ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , T} (1.10)
This redefinition effectively embeds the constraints into the objective function,
yielding a simplified problem:
min
k1...kN
T∑
t=1
(
Rt,F −
N∑
i=1
Ri,t × Si,ki,t−1 × Pi,t−1∑N
i=1 Si,ki,t−1 × Pi,t−1
)2
(1.11)
This combinatiorial problem remains non-trivial: for a portfolio of 75 stocks in
a quarter of 60 trading days, there are more than 2 × 10133 different possible trade
sequences.3 This is larger than the estimated number of atoms in the universe, by
many orders of magnitude.
3There are T possibilities for each stock. The total possible sequences is TN .
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Relaxing the Assumption of a Single Trade per Quarter
The assumption of a single trade per stock per quarter is likely overrestrictive, given
that institutional trades are typically spread over time (Barclay and Warner, 1993).
In order to allow for multiple trades on a given stock, I split the fund’s holdings of
each stock into four equal portions. The algorithm treats each portion of a holding
as an individual stock and selects the trade date for each portion independently. For
example, if a fund purchased 100 shares of a given stock in a quarter, I break the
quarterly trade into four distinct trades of 25 shares. The algorithm then selects the
purchase date for each bundle of 25 shares that is most consistent with the model.
Once a solution is found, I recombine the individual portions of each stock to calculate
the daily holdings of the stock within the fund’s portfolio.
Implied Daily Fund Flows
When combined, the fund’s returns and holdings imply a daily level of fund flows,
given the model’s assumption that the portfolio is invested entirely in equities. To
improve the selection mechanism, I impose a restriction against solutions that imply
infeasible daily fund flows. Assuming that the total assets are equal to the sum of
shares multiplied by their respective prices, it can be shown that the model’s implied
flows on day t are equal to:
flowt =
∑N
i=1 Si,t × Pi,t −
(∑N
i=1 Si,t−1 × Pi,t−1
)
× (1 +Rt,F )∑N
i=1 Si,t−1 × Pi,t−1
. (1.12)
Given that daily fund flows are typically small and to allow for coarseness in the
modeled trades, I add a penalty of -0.01 to the fitness function for each day that
implied flows exceed 2.5%. A penalty function is a technique to add constraints when
bounding the set of acceptable solutions (Yeniay, 2005). The penalty has to be large
enough that the algorithm heavily disfavors solutions that violate the constraint.
With the constraint, the problem becomes:
min
k1...kN
T∑
t=1
(Rt,F − N∑
i=1
Ri,t × Si,ki,t−1 × Pi,t−1∑N
i=1 Si,ki,t−1 × Pi,t−1
)2
+ 0.01Vt
 , (1.13)
where Vt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the implied flows constraint is violated
and zero otherwise. I minimize the function in (13) by selecting values of (k1, . . . , kN)
according to the genetic algorithm.
1.2.4 The Genetic Algorithm
The genetic algorithm is a biologically inspired procedure used to optimize complex
discrete mathematical problems. The link to biology is an analogy that compares the
decision variables to a chain of DNA with genetic information. The algorithm se-
lects the optimal solution over numerous generations based upon the principles of
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Darwinian evolution: the fit reproduce while the remaining candidates are discarded
(McCall, 2004). In the context of a mathematical problem, the fitness of a candi-
date solution is equal to the evaluation of the objective function. I transform the
minimization into a maximization problem by multiplying the objective function by
negative 1.
For each fund and quarter, I begin with a population of randomly generated
candidate solutions. For each candidate, I evaluate its fitness based on equation
(1.13). Each candidate solution is then ranked according to its fitness. Those with
the highest fitness are selected with greater probability for replication. Within the
replication group, solutions are paired at random to create child solutions for the next
generation. For each solution variable, the child takes on a value selected from either
parent at random, with a small number of values perturbed by a random mutation.
This procedure is repeated for a large number of generations, converging to a solution.
To implement the genetic algorithm, I select values for the hyperparameters. I
use trial and error in order to optimize performance along computational speed and
convergence to a solution, however, I do not measure the quality of the solutions in
the selection of hyperparameters.4 I generate an initial population of 7,500 random
candidate solutions for the first generation. After computing the fitness of each
candidate, I select the top 1,200 with an additional 300 solutions at random to form
the replication group of 1,500. From this group, each randomly matched solution
pair creates 10 child solutions. This results in a stable population size of 7,500 each
generation. Within each candidate solution, each choice variable (ki), has a 1% chance
of mutation, where the value is changed to a random integer between 1 and T. After
repeating the procedure for 300 generations, I select the solution with the highest
fitness.
1.3 Model Validation with Trade Level Data
The model relies on several assumptions designed to approximate the fund’s daily
trading. In this section, I examine the validity of the model empirically using a sample
of institutional equity trades from ANcerno Ltd. (formerly the Abel Noser Corpo-
ration). The sample contains detailed trade information including the transaction
price, the direction of the trade, and the day on which the trade took place. This
offers an ideal setting to validate the model since the typically unobservable data are
disclosed. ANcerno records trades at the manager level on behalf of their specific
clients and this data became availabe to researchers for years 1999-2011. I consider
4The genetric algorithm is a stochastic optimization technique, which causes final solutions to vary
from one another even with the same initial conditions. Solutions in this context are in fact only
approximations. Selecting a large population slows down the total computation speed, however
a small population may not contain sufficient information to converge to the optimal solution.
Techniques exist for hyperparameter optimization, see Bergstra and Bengio (2012) for example.
While this would improve the model fit, it would require additional cross-validation tests. Further,
it is not guaranteed that the hyperparameters would be optimal for use on the broader mutual
fund data (S12 and daily returns).
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the manager-client pair as a unique fund for the purpose of the analysis.5
Similar to Jame (2018), Puckett and Yan (2011) and other studies that use AN-
cerno data, I aggregate each fund’s trades over its first 36 months in the sample,
creating a measure of daily holdings. In order to avoid funds that do not trade fre-
quently, each fund must make at least one trade each month to remain in the sample.
I then remove positions less than zero and merge with the CRSP daily securities file
based on the CUSIP and day for each stock. I compute daily returns for the fund
based on the daily holdings, daily trades, execution prices, and the daily closing price
of each stock. This yields a sample of daily holdings and returns for institutional
funds trading US equities. For quarterly holdings measures, I record the holdings as
of the quarter end dates: December 31, March 31, June 30, and September 30.
1.3.1 Empirical Validation
I use a genetic algorithm to minimize equation (1.13) for each fund-quarter in order
to find the dynamic portfolio that best replicates fund’s observed daily returns. For
ease of interpretation, I refer to the fitness of the function as the evaluation of equation
(1.13) multiplied by -1. This allows for higher values of fitness to be interpreted as a
greater fit on the data. Figure 1 plots the histogram of fitness values for the sample of
funds in Ancerno. Since a fitness of zero would indicate a perfect fit, the distribution
is truncated on the right. The distribution is therefore negatively skewed with a mean
(median) fitness value of -0.020 (-0.007).
To measure the model’s goodness-of-fit on the daily holdings, I estimate each in-
dividual fund’s portfolio allocation within each quarter in the ANcerno sample and
compare this with its observed allocation. At the end of each day, I calculate the
dollar-weighted error between the modeled and the true portfolio allocation:
Errort =
N∑
i=1
(
(Si,t,M − Si,t,O)× Pi,t
TNAt
)2
, (1.14)
where Si,t,M and Si,t,O represent the modeled and the observed number of shares of
stock i held by the fund on day t. TNAt is the total net assets of the fund on day t.
I calculate total net assets as the total value of all equity holdings at the end of day
t. To measure the overall fit, I calculate the mean square error (MSE) of the dollar
weighted allocation by taking an equal weighted average of each Errort throughout
the quarter:
MSE =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Errort. (1.15)
5The funds in this sample are actual institutional investors, however all trades need not be executed
by mutual funds. For example, several studies Jame (2018); Puckett and Yan (2011); Cohen, Lou,
and Malloy (2016) have used Ancerno outside of the mutual fund context.
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I compare the model with alternative assumptions of intraquarter holdings. The
path of each Si,t,T throughout the quarter is nonlinear, which invalidates linear re-
gressions and the commonly used R-squared as a metric for goodness-of-fit (Spiess
and Neumeyer, 2010). To evaluate the model’s performance, I compare its MSE with
that of four alternative assumptions: trades that take place at the beginning, middle,
end, or that take place evenly throughout the quarter.
Table 1.1 presents the average MSE for the model and the alternative assumptions.
Directly comparing the average MSE among alternatives is uninformative, given the
skewness in both the fitness and the MSE distributions. In column (2), I calculate
the average ratio of the model’s MSE (MSEmodel) to the alternative. The average
ratio ranges from 0.23 for the assumption that trades take place at the end-of-quarter
to 0.79 for the portfolio that trades evenly throughout the quarter. To verify that
the ratios are statistically less than 1, I apply a t-test on the log of the ratio. In
each case, the log-transformed value is less than zero, statistically significant at the
1% level. Overall, this indicates that the modeled portfolio holdings approximate the
true portfolio’s intra-quarter holdings better than the existing alternatives.
Regressions: Model Fitness and Holdings MSE
The central assumption of the model is that the trade pattern that best replicates
the fund’s daily returns also contains information about the true underlying holdings
within the quarter. To confirm that the fit of the model in equation (1.13) corresponds
with a stronger prediction of holdings, I investigate the relation between fitness and
the quarter’s holdings MSE. Intuitively, fund-quarters with a greater algorithm fitness
should have a better fit on the daily holdings. To test this, I regress the MSE of the
holdings onto the fitness of the modeled portfolio:
ln(MSEholdings) = α + β × ln(fitnessmodel) + γ′Controls+ . (1.16)
To account for mechanical relations explained by fund characteristics, I include
controls for the number of stocks in the portfolio, the total net assets of the fund,
the ratio of stocks traded to total stocks in the portfolio, as well as fund and quarter
fixed effects. All continuous variables are log transformed in order to measure elas-
ticities.6 Given the potential of residual correlation across fund and time (Petersen,
2009), standard errors are clustered at the fund and quarter. Table 1.2 presents the
regression results of equation (1.16). A 1% increase in fitness coincides with an es-
timated reduction in the MSE of approximately 0.4%. Overall, this indicates that
the strength of the model’s fitness corresponds with its ability to predict holdings in
between quarterly filings.
Next, I verify that the fitness of the algorithm estimate corresponds with an
improved measure of intraquarter holdings relative to alternative assumptions. In
Panel B, I replace model MSE on the left hand side of equation (1.16) with the ratio
of the model MSE over the MSE from the next best alternative, the evenly traded
portfolio. The coefficient β can be interpreted as the marginal improvement in the
6Since the domain of fitness is (−∞, 0], I use the following transformation: −log(−fitness).
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estimate of intraquarter holdings relative to the. A 1% increase in fitness coincides
with an estimated reduction in the MSE ratio by approximately 0.08%.
Liquidity Provision in the Ancerno Sample
As an addition test, I verify that the modelled trades indicate a similar liquidity
provision trading style when compared with the actual trades in ANcerno. In this
context, liquidity provision is the trading against short-term mispricing from non-
fundamental pressure (Nagel, 2012). The liquidity supplier provides immediacy at
favorable prices and realizes a return as prices later reverse.
To estimate the fund’s tendency to supply liquidity, I use the trade-based momen-
tum measure of Jame (2018). For each stock on each day, the previous one-day and
five-day market-adjusted returns are calculated. The momentum measure, Mom1&5,
is defined as the average of the 1 and 5 days market-adjusted returns. Since non-
fundamental price movement causes reversals, liquidity supplying trades are defined
as purchases (sales) in stocks that have decreased (increased) in price over the re-
cent past. At the fund level, the momentum measure is calculated quarterly by
taking the dollar-volume weighted average Mom1&5 of stocks purchased minus the
dollar-volume weighted average of stocks sold. Funds with higher (lower) levels of
momentum trading are defined as liquidity demanders (suppliers) since they suffer
(benefit) from the price subsequent reversals in their trades.
Table 1.3 presents the correlation matrix between the momentum measure es-
timated on the observed daily trades (Mom1&5), the algorithm (Mom1&5calc), the
evenly traded (Mom1&5smooth), and the quarterly momentum measure of Jame (2018)
(Mom1&5Q). The last two measures are almost identical as they both assume trading
is equally likely within the quarter.7 Among the approximations of the momentum
measure from observed daily trades (Mom1&5), the algorithm-calculated measure has
the highest correlation value of 0.76. This suggests that the daily estimated trades
are informative for estimating trading style.
Next, I compare the measures in a multivariate setting. Since Mom1&5Q and
Mom1&5smooth are almost perfectly correlated (r = 0.98), I omit Mom1&5smooth.
Standardizing the variables to be mean zero and standard deviation of one, I regress
the momentum measure from observed daily trades (Mom1&5) onto the momentum
measure from the estimated daily trades (Mom1&5calc) and the quarterly momentum
measure (Mom1&5Q). Table 1.3, Panel B presents the results. Both coefficients are
positive and statistically significant; however, the algorithm calculated measure is
stronger with a coefficient of 0.51 compared to 0.19 for Mom1&5Q. An F-test rejects
the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal. This suggests that the estimated
daily trades provide a stronger approximation of the derived momentum trading style
measure than alternative existing assumptions.
7Mom1&5Q is calculated as if the trade takes place on the last day of the quarter and evenly weighs
Mom1&5 throughout the quarter. This produces a slightly different measure from the evenly traded
assumption. The evenly traded pattern is calculated as if the trades take place evenly throughout
the quarter and Mom1&5 is averaged accordingly. The difference between the two measures come
from intraquarter variation in stock prices and portfolio weights.
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1.4 Application: US Active Mutual Funds 2002-2016
In the previous section, I used a sample of observable institutional trades to demon-
strate that the model provides an improved estimate of both intraquarter holdings and
a derived measure of liquidity provision style. In this section, I apply the method-
ology to the sample of US active mutual funds from 2002-2016, in line with when
funds consistently began reporting their holdings quarterly.8 The precise estimate
of intraquarter holdings enables a trade-based measure of liquidity provision previ-
ously unavailable to mutual funds. I use this measure to show the predictive relation
between fund liquidity provision on future returns.
1.4.1 Mutual Fund Data and Methodology
Mutual fund holdings data come from the Thomson Reuters S12 file. Daily fund
returns and NAV data, as well as quarterly reported fund characteristics are drawn
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I aggregate returns and
holdings to the fund level and use MFLINKS to merge the two databases. Following
Jordan and Riley (2016), I apply several screens to ensure that the funds are actively
managed and invested primarily in domestic equities: funds must not be identified
as index funds, ETFs, or annuities. An additional screen for terms within the fund
name is applied to remove funds not primarily invested in U.S. equities. I restrict the
sample to funds with a minimum of 90% in equities and a maxiumum of 10% in cash.
In order to ensure that the data is reliable, I follow Coval and Stafford (2007) and
impose several restrictions: quarterly flows must be between −50% and 200% and
total net assets must have been less than $1 billion in the past. In addition, I require
that the ratio of TNA between the two databases not exceed 1.1 (or fall below 1/1.1)
and the fund must have at least 20 holdings.
For each fund-quarter, I estimate intraquarter holdings by finding the trade pattern
that is most consistent with the fund’s observed daily returns. Since returns are
reported for the entire fund, including cash holdings, I divide the reported daily
return by the one minus the fraction of the fund’s cash holdings:
Rt,F =
Rt,F,reported
(1−%Cash) (1.17)
This transformation offsets the effects of the cash drag on the estimate of the
fund’s equity portfolio returns. Funds hold cash for a variety of reasons particularly
to meet redemptions, especially when flows are volatile (Chordia, 1996; Yan, 2006).
Given that cash needs can vary throughout the quarter, I add the percentage of cash
holdings to the model. I replace Rt,F in equation (1.13) with the right hand side of
8Prior to this, most funds reported semi-annually. Quarterly holdings disclosures were mandated
only at the fund family level through the 13-F filings.
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equation (1.17):
min
k1...kN ,%Cash
T∑
t=1
( Rt,F,reported
(1−%Cash) −
N∑
i=1
Ri,t × Si,k,t−1 × Pi,t−1∑N
i=1 Si,k,t−1 × Pi,t−1
)2
+ 0.01Vt
 ,
(1.18)
Since this remains an discrete problem, I restrict the estimation of the portfolio
invested in cash, %Cash, to integers between 1 and 10 percent. This approximation
could be relaxed to allow for smaller intervals and added precision, however I must
trade off precision for computational resources.9 This reflects the method’s major
trade-off: I accept an approximation in order to create a problem that can be solved.
1.4.2 Liquidity Provision of Active Mutual Funds
In order to estimate the daily trades of US active mutual funds, I minimize equation
(1.18) using the genetic algorithm. To reduce noise in the estimates, I restrict the
sample to funds with a fitness value greater than -0.15.10 Based on the trades, I
repeat the analysis from section 3.1.2 and calculate the fund’s momentum trading
measure each quarter.
Table 1.4, Panel A presents summary statistics for the final sample of 64,480 fund-
quarters. The mean Mom1&5 estimates are positive indicating that, on average,
mutual funds demand liquidity. This is consistent with Rinne and Suominen (2014)
and the negative average value for βRLP . Panel B presents the correlation matrix:
Mom1&5calc and Mom1&5Q are are highly correlated (r = 0.51), consistent with
their relation estimated within the Ancerno sample (r = 0.58) in Table 1.3. The two
measures are negatively correlated with βRLP by design: higher values of momentum
are consistent with liquidity demand, whereas higher values for βRLP are consistent
with a greater exposure to the priced liquidity provision factor of Rinne and Suominen
(2014). Overall, this suggests that Mom1&5calc shares information about the fund’s
tendency to supply liquidity with the existing regression-based measure, however the
measures capture different aspects of this style given the modest correlation coefficient
of -0.06.
To examine the persistence of the fund’s tendency to supply liquidity, I sort the
funds into quintiles each quarter based upon their level of Mom1&5calc over the
prior two quarters. If a fund follows a consistent liquidity trading style, the quintiles
averages should preserve a similar ordering of Mom1&5calc. Figure 2 presents the
average level of Mom1&5calc based upon the prior two quarter quintile sorts. The
monotonic increase in the average level of Mom1&5calc suggests that past estimates
of the fund’s tendency tend to predict future liquidity demand.
9For example, allowing the average cash holdings to vary at intervals of 0.5% would increase the
precision of the final estimates, however this would require greater resources. In addition, the
selection the optimal interval is an additional optimization problem in and of itself.
10Fitness is defined as previously: the objective function (equation 1.18) multiplied by negative
1. Restricting funds to fitness greater than -0.15 eliminates 33,907 fund-quarters. Lowering the
fitness threshold produces qualitatively similar results.
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Given the measure’s persistence, I investigate the relation between the momentum
trading and future fund returns. In Figure 3, I compare the fund returns from quintile
sorts based the previous two quarters’ Mom1&5calc. There is a pattern associating
greater liquidity provision (low Mom1&5calc) with higher performance: average re-
turns decrease almost monotonically from the top quintile (3.2 bps) to the bottom
quintile (-9.3 bps). Taken together, the univariate evidence in Figures (2) and (3)
suggests that liquidity provision is persistent over time and this can be used to pre-
dict future returns. Next, I turn to a multivariate regression setting to investigate
whether the measure can predict abnormal returns.
1.4.3 Liquidity Provision and Abnormal Returns
To test whether the momentum factor is associated with future abnormal returns,
I use the quintile sorted portfolios based upon the prior two quarters’ Mom1&5calc. I
create a new portfolio that is long the portfolio of quintile 5 and short that of quintile
1, rebalancing every month for the length of the time series. I regress the portfolio
returns Rq5−q1 onto the Fama-French 4-factor model, augmented by the RLP liquidity
provision factor of Rinne and Suominen (2014).
Table 1.5 presents the regression results. In specification (1) , there is at -16
basis point abnormal return to the long minus short portfolio. This result indicates
that high momentum funds significantly underperform on a risk-adjusted basis when
compared to low momentum funds. To examine how an individual can more profitably
invest with this information, I estimate the abnormal returns for the low and the high
momentum portfolio separately. The low portfolio, presented in specification (2), has
an alpha of -6 basis points, which is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The
portfolio formed from the funds with the highest values of momentum underperform
with an alpha of -16.64 basis points. This suggests that the difference in abnormal
returns comes from the most liquidity demanding quintile. An investor can receive
higher returns simply by avoiding the most liquidity demanding funds in terms of
Mom1&5calc.
1.4.4 Liquidity Provision and Cross-sectional Fund Returns
To test whether the fund’s liquidity provision style predicts future cross-sectional
returns, I estimate 165 monthly Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions. Specifically, each
month I regress fund excess returns onto measures of liquidity provision with common
control variables in the mutual fund literature:
R−Rf = α + β × Liquidity Provision+ γ′Controls+ . (1.19)
Standard errors are corrected for potential time-series dependence using the Newey-
West (1987) procedure. Liquidity provision measures, Mom1&5calc, Mom1&5end,
Mom1&5Q, and βRLP are standardized to have zero mean and unit standard devia-
tion. Mom1&5calc and Mom1&5Q are averaged over the past two quarters; βRLP is
estimated over the past two years using monthly returns data (Rinne and Suominen,
2014) and is rank transformed. Control variables include expenses, turnover, cash,
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fund age, total net assets, and percent flows. All controls are expressed as percent-
ages, except for TNA and fund age, which are by transformed the natural logarithm.
All controls are lagged by one quarter, except fund flows, which are lagged by one,
two, and three months.
Table 1.6 presents the regression results. Specification (1) through (5) do not in-
clude fixed effects; specification (6) includes fund style fixed effects based upon CRSP
style codes. Overall, the results are consistent with liquidity suppliers achieving higher
returns in the cross-section. A one standard deviation decrease in Mom1&5calc is as-
sociated with an estimated marginal increase in excess returns between 4.4 and 5.9
basis points. In specification (6), with all the control variables, the marginal effect
is 5.9 basis points in absolute terms. Momentum measures based on solely quarterly
data, Mom1&5Q and Mom1&5end, do not predict future returns with statistical
significance. The coefficient on the rank transformed βRLP is positive but not sta-
tistically significant. Overall, this evidence suggests that the daily holdings-based
liquidity provision measure is associated with future fund excess returns, controlling
for a variety of factors. This prediction is incremental above the existing regression
based measure.
1.4.5 Liquidity Provision and Fund Flows
I examine whether investors anticipate future fund performance from liquidity pro-
vision. Investors typically reward funds for outperforming benchmarks with greater
inflows (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002; Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner, 2009; Sirri and Tufano,
1998), however there has been mixed evidence on whether this predicts future returns
(Frazzini and Lamont, 2008; Zheng, 1999). If investors recognize the fund’s tendency
to supply liquidity and its relation with future returns, the momentum measure could
capture future fund flows. To test this relation, I run a panel regression of monthly
flows onto mom1&5calc:
flowt = β0 + β1 ×mom1&5calc + γ′Controls+ . (1.20)
Controls follow Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) and include: an indicator for out-
performing the S&P 500, lagged excess returns (separated above and below the S&P
500), Jensen’s alpha (separated above and below the S&P 500), and the tracking
error (separated above and below the Jensen’s alpha above the lagged excess returns
above the S&P 500), fund age, TNA, lagged flow, and year × style dummies. Overall
these measures control for the fund flows that result from performance without an
explicit recognition of liquidity provision.
Table 1.7 presents the regression results. The first column’s measure of flows is
in millions of dollars; the second column uses a percent flow expressed as fraction
between 0 and 1. Overall, investors reward performance: lagged excess returns and
Jensen’s alpha are strongly associated with inflows. In addition investors react dif-
ferently to diversifiable risk, measured with tracking error, depending on the state
of performance. A one percent increase in tracking error is associated with a 0.5%
inflow when performance is above the S&P 500, however this is associated with a
2.1% outflow when the fund underperforms the benchmark.
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The variable of interest, mom1&5calc , has a small estimated effect on flows and is
statistically indistinguishable from zero. The 95% confidence interval for the marginal
effect of a one standard deviation of mom1&5calc on the percent flows is between -
0.004% and 0.004%. Given how closely the confidence interval straddles zero, the
relationship between liquidity provision and future fund flows is very modest if it
exists at all. This suggests that investors investors tend not to respond very strongly
to the fund’s liquidity provision style.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper develops a method to estimate mutual fund positions in between man-
dated filings using the fund’s daily returns and its quarterly holdings. Using a sample
of observable institutional trading, I show that the method yields an improved es-
timate of both intraquarter trading and a trade-based liquidity provision measure
versus existing na¨ıve assumptions. I apply the method to the broad sample of mu-
tual funds from 2002 to 2016. Using the estimated daily holdings, I show that the
fund’s tendency to supply liquidity is persistent over time and that this characteristic
predicts future abnormal returns.
The main methodological contribution of this paper is the synthesis of both ob-
servable fund characteristics, individual stock level data, and known economic rela-
tionships, such as the definition of a portfolio return, into a single measure of daily
holdings. This provides two clear advantages: (1) by construction, the measure
contains more information than its components taken separately and (2) the mea-
sure reflects actual trades which facilitates interpretation and applicability to various
problems. This is particularly useful for a trading style measure such as liquidity
provision: the momentum measure can be estimated with a single quarter of data
using trades that are observed at the quarterly level.
The model can be extended to consider more data that are commonly available
in financial research. For example, the total trading volume of a given stock could
be used in the model with all mutual fund trading estimated simultaneously over a
single quarter. This for example, could bound the selection space and improve the
accuracy of the predictions. A separate improvement could involve machine learning
over the limited existing daily trade data in order to uncover empirical regularities in
mutual fund trading.
Finally, the methodology outlined in this paper can be applied to a range of topics
surrounding mutual fund behavior and performance. The estimated daily holdings
could be used to measure various aspects of trading such as investor externalities and
agency costs. For instance, Kacperczyk et al. (2006) find that unobservable actions
consistently predict fund performance. Aside from the liquidity provision style, future
research could uncover additional trading characteristics with the estimated daily
holdings, such as portfolio pumping, window dressing, and informed trading over
short-horizons.
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Table 1.1: Intraquarter Holdings MSE
Panel A presents the summary statistics for the mean squared error (MSE) of holdings estimated
by several assumptions of trading. GA uses the genetic algorithm to optimize the holdings model
developed in this paper. Start, Middle, and End assume that all trades take place on the first,
middle, or last day of the quarter respectively. Smooth assumes that the trades take place evenly.
For readability, values are scaled by 104. Panel B presents summary statistics for the ratio of MSE
for Start, Middle, and End divided to the MSE from the model (GA). The rightmost column contains
the p-values for a t-test of whether the log ratio is equal to zero. This tests the null-hypothesis that
the ratio is equal to 1. The portfolio allocation error and quarterly MSE are calculated as follows:
Errort =
∑N
i=1
(
(Si,t,M−Si,t,O)×Pi,t
TNAt
)2
; MSE =
1
T
∑T
t=1Errort.
Panel A
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GA 8.970 35.700 0.001 296.930
Start 53.980 208.510 0.007 1739.000
Middle 28.020 107.940 0.003 859.940
End 59.250 223.240 0.006 1739.600
Smooth 17.660 70.290 0.002 584.890
*Values scaled (×104)
Panel B
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P-Value
(Ratio 6= 1)
GA/Start 0.255 0.574 0.002 28.076 0.0000
GA/Middle 0.486 0.348 0.003 6.797 0.0000
GA/End 0.227 0.193 0.002 3.704 0.0000
GA/Smooth 0.781 0.439 0.005 4.863 0.0000
Observations 2693
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Table 1.2: Regressions of Holdings MSE on Model Fitness
In Panel A, I regress the intraquarter holdings MSE from the model, estimated with the genetic
algorithm, MSEga, onto the model’s fitnes, the number of stocks, the number of stocks traded,
and the TNA of the fund. In Panel B, I replace MSEcalc with the ratio of MSEga to the error of
the next best alternative assumption, MSEsmooth. All variables are log transformed. Numbers in
parentheses are two-way clustered standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and
1% level respectively.
Panel A
ln(MSEcalc)
ln(fitness) -0.420*** -0.432*** -0.431*** -0.405*** -0.411***
(0.041) (0.044) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044)
ln(stocks) -0.714*** -0.330***
(0.119) (0.103)
ln(trade) -0.125 -0.550
(0.566) (0.544)
ln(tna) -0.755*** -0.559***
(0.120) (0.119)
Fund & Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,604 2,604 2,604 2,604 2,604
R2 0.800 0.819 0.806 0.823 0.824
Panel B
ln(
MSEcalc
MSEsmooth
)
ln(fitness) -0.069*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.085*** -0.076***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
ln(stocks) 0.450*** 0.457***
(0.055) (0.060)
ln(trade) -0.216 0.292
(0.254) (0.246)
ln(tna) 0.274*** 0.001
(0.045) (0.042)
Fund & Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,604 2,604 2,604 2,604 2,604
R2 0.521 0.572 0.532 0.549 0.572
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Table 1.3: Liquidity Provision Measures (Ancerno Sample)
For each stock on each day, the previous one-day and five-day market-adjusted returns are calculated.
The momentum measure, Mom1&5, is defined as the average of the 1 and 5 days market-adjusted
returns (Jame, 2018). At the fund level, the momentum measure is calculated quarterly by taking
the dollar-volume weighted average Mom1&5 of stocks purchased minus the dollar-volume weighted
average of stocks sold. Panel A presents the correlation matrix between the momentum measure
estimated based upon various assumptions of daily trades: the observed daily trades (Mom1&5),
the algorithm estimated trades(Mom1&5calc), the evenly traded (Mom1&5smooth), and the quar-
terly momentum measure of Jame (2018) (Mom1&5Q). Panel B presents regression results where
Mom1&5 is regressed on Mom1&5calc and Mom1&5smooth. Numbers in parentheses are two-way
clustered standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively.
Panel A: Correlation Matrix
mom1&5 mom1&5calc mom1&5smooth mom1&5Q
mom1&5 1
mom1&5calc 0.756 1
mom1&5smooth 0.586 0.568 1
mom1&5Q 0.599 0.583 0.989 1
Panel B: Regression
mom1&5
mom1&5calc 0.509***
(0.020)
mom1&5smooth 0.190***
(0.021)
Observations 2,604
R-squared 0.712
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Table 1.4: Liquidity Provision Measures (Mutual Fund S12 Sample)
Table 4 presents summary statistics and the correlation matrix of liquidity provision measures esti-
mated for the 59,832 fund-quarters in the S12 sample of active mutual funds from 2002-2016. For
each stock on each day, the previous one-day and five-day market-adjusted returns are calculated.
Following Jame (2017), the momentum measure, Mom1&5, is defined as the average of the 1 and 5
days market-adjusted returns. At the fund level, the momentum measure mom1&5calc is calculated
quarterly by taking the dollar-volume weighted average Mom1&5 of stocks purchased minus the
dollar-volume weighted average of stocks sold. mom1&5end assumes all trades are made on the final
day of the quarter. Mom1&5Q is estimated quarterly. βRLP is the regression-estimated liquidity
provision factor of Rinne and Suominen (2014); RankβRLP is the quintile rank of βRLP .
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
mom1&5calc 64,480 0.020 0.081 -1.256 1.476
mom1&5Q 64,480 0.004 0.050 -0.630 0.510
mom1&5end 64,480 0.004 0.069 -1.414 2.695
βRLP 64,480 -0.151 1.077 -10.050 13.565
RankβRLP 64,480 3 13.816 1 5
*Values scaled (×10)
Panel B: Correlation Matrix
mom1&5calc mom1&5Q mom1&5end βRLP RankβRLP
mom1&5calc 1
mom1&5Q 0.504 1
mom1&5end 0.144 0.174 1
βRLP -0.061 -0.071 -0.006 1
RankβRLP -0.056 -0.071 -0.004 0.760 1
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Table 1.5: 4-Factor Time Series Regressions
Each quarter, I sort the funds into quintiles based on their level of mom1&5calc. I create a new
portfolio that is long the portfolio of quintile 5 and short that of quintile 1, rebalancing every month
for the length of the time series. I regress the portfolio returns onto the Fama-French 4-factor
model. To formulate the portfolios, I used the average measures of mom1&5calc over the prior two
quarters. Column (1) represents the returns to the portfolio long quintile 5 and short quintile 1
of mom1&5calc. Columns (2) and (3) represent returns to the portfolios long quintile 5 and short
quintile 1 separately. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at
the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
α -16.038*** -0.061 -16.644***
(5.078) (3.883) (5.434)
Rm −Rf 0.039*** 0.998*** 1.037***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
SMB 0.000 0.286*** 0.286***
(0.030) (0.023) (0.028)
HML -0.138*** 0.014 -0.124***
(0.029) (0.022) (0.033)
UMD 0.133*** -0.061*** 0.072***
(0.023) (0.017) (0.016)
RLP -0.408** -0.132 -0.540***
(0.200) (0.173) (0.185)
Observations 165 165 165
R2 0.581 0.989 0.979
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Table 1.6: Fama-MacBeth Regressions
I estimate 165 monthly Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions. Liquidity provision measures,
Mom1&5calc, Mom1&5end, Mom1&5Q, and βRLP are standardized to have zero mean and unit
standard deviation. Mom1&5calc, Mom1&5end, and Mom1&5Q are averaged over the past two
quarters; βRLP is estimated over the past two years using monthly returns data (Rinne and Suomi-
nen, 2014). Control variables include expenses, turnover, cash, fund age, total net assets, and
percent flows. All controls are expressed as percentages, except for TNA and fund age, which are
by transformed the natural logarithm. All controls are lagged by one quarter, except fund flows,
which are lagged by one, two, and three months. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West (1987)
corrected standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively.
Excess Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mom1&5calc -5.608** -4.357** -5.195*** -5.917***
(2.833) (1.719) (1.608) (1.634)
mom1&5Q -4.840 -0.0403 2.177 2.649
(3.091) (3.043) (2.701) (2.697)
mom1&5end -4.377 -3.205 -3.202 -2.980
(2.836) (2.601) (2.390) (2.444)
RankβRLP 0.631 0.590
(1.941) (1.949)
Expenses -3.812 -3.321
(5.231) (5.286)
Turnover -0.0273 -0.0230
(0.0210) (0.0214)
Cash -0.122 -0.138
(0.377) (0.383)
ln(TNA) 5.228 4.831
(3.212) (3.165)
ln(TNA)2 -0.510* -0.454
(0.280) (0.277)
ln(Age) 29.49** 33.18**
(13.41) (13.85)
ln(Age) -5.304** -5.981**
(2.599) (2.661)
flowt−1 0.461 0.438
(0.380) (0.381)
flowt−2 -0.184 -0.135
(0.317) (0.345)
flowt−3 -0.322 -0.342
(0.342) (0.350)
Style FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 120,051 120,051 120,051 120,051 120,051 120,051
Average R2 0.019 0.022 0.011 0.034 0.119 0.140
Number of months 165 165 165 165 165 165
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Table 1.7: Liquidity Provision and Fund Flows
I estimate pooled cross-sectional and time series regressions of monthly fund flows onto the
mom1&5calc with controls for performance. Controls follow Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) and
include: an indicator for outperforming the S&P 500, lagged excess returns (separated above and
below the S&P 500), Jensen’s alpha (separated above and below the S&P 500), and the tracking
error (separated above and below the Jensen’s alpha above the lagged excess returns above the S&P
500), fund age, TNA, lagged flow, and year × style dummies. Due to the coefficient magnitude, I
scale mom1&5calc by 1000. In the first regression column, flows are measured in millions of dollars;
the second column uses a percent flow expressed as fraction between 0 and 1. Standard errors are
clustered by fund and month. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively.
Flow ($) Flow (%)
mom1&5calc (× 1,000) 1,267 -0.028
(1,010) (0.235)
Outperform S&P 500 dummy 2.382** 0.001
(0.983) (0.001)
Lagged excess return (above S&P 500) 49.657 0.226***
(36.792) (0.032)
Lagged excess return (below S&P 500) 125.699*** 0.130***
(35.596) (0.0321)
Jensen’s alpha (above S&P 500) 1,900*** 1.587***
(264.826) (0.113)
Jensen’s alpha (below S&P 500) 1,090*** 0.900***
(181.182) (0.122)
Tracking error (above S&P 500) 10.55*** 0.005**
(3.645) (0.002)
Tracking error (below S&P 500) -0.624 -0.021***
(2.901) (0.003)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 120,051 120,051
R2 0.143 0.028
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of Fitness: Ancerno Sample
Figure 1 plots the frequency distribution of fitness values for the sample of 2,604 fund quarters in
Ancerno. I use the genetic algorithm to minimize equation (13) for each fund-quarter in order to
find the dynamic portfolio that best replicates fund’s observed daily returns:
min
k1...kN
T∑
t=1
(Rt,F − N∑
i=1
Ri,t × Si,ki,t−1 × Pi,t−1∑N
i=1 Si,ki,t−1 × Pi,t−1
)2
+ 0.01Vt
 .
Rt,F is the return to the fund on day t. Ri,t and Pi,t are the return and price of stock i on day t.
Si,k,t−1 is the number of shares held in stock i on day t − 1. Si,k,t−1 takes on a value equal to ST
(the end of quarter holdings) if k ≥ t − 1 and S0 (the start of quarter holdings) otherwise. There
are N stocks in the portfolio and T days in the quarter. Vt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
implied flows constraint is violated and zero otherwise. I minimize the function by selecting values
of (k1, . . . , kN ). For ease of interpretation, I refer to the fitness of the function as the evaluation of
equation (13) multiplied by -1. This allows for higher values of fitness to be interpreted as a greater
fit on the data.
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Figure 1.2: Mom1&5calc Persistence
This figure presents the average values of mom1&5calc based on quintile sorts of the fund’s average
mom1&5calc over the past two quarters from 2002Q4 to 2016Q2. Following Jame (2017), the mo-
mentum measure, Mom1&5, is defined as the average of the 1 and 5 days market-adjusted returns.
At the fund level, the momentum measure mom1&5calc is calculated quarterly by taking the dollar-
volume weighted average Mom1&5 of stocks purchased minus the dollar-volume weighted average
of stocks sold.
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Figure 1.3: Mom1&5calc and Future Returns
Each quarter, I sort the funds into quintiles based on their level of mom1&5calc over the past two
quarters. Following Jame (2017), the momentum measure, Mom1&5, is defined as the average of
the 1 and 5 days market-adjusted returns. At the fund level, the momentum measure mom1&5calc
is calculated quarterly by taking the dollar-volume weighted average Mom1&5 of stocks purchased
minus the dollar-volume weighted average of stocks sold. This figure presents the average market
excess monthly returns returns for the five portfolios from October 2002 to June 2016.
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Chapter 2 The Democratization of Investment Research: Implications
for Retail Investor Profitability and Firm Liquidity
2.1 Introduction
Information is a key ingredient for well-functioning financial markets. Without a
broad base of investors with access to accurate information, pricing securities becomes
difficult and markets can stagnate. At the same time, information with high invest-
ment value tends to be costly to produce, which has left individuals at a perennial
disadvantage relative to institutional investors. In recent decades, improvements in
technology have significantly reduced the cost of gathering and sharing investment
information, and these developments have been lauded for their potential to help level
the informational playing field.1
In this article, we examine the extent to which an important technology-enabled
innovation, crowdsourced investment research, has led to improved individual investor
decision-making and enhanced market liquidity. Few finance media sites exemplify
the democratization of investment research better than Seeking Alpha (SA). Seek-
ing Alpha attracts millions of visitors each month by providing curated investment
research from thousands of individual research contributors.2 The value of Seek-
ing Alpha’s investor-authored research is well documented. For example, Chen, et
al. (2014) find that Seeking Alpha research articles predict future stock returns and
earnings surprises. In our analysis, we examine whether individual investors benefit
from Seeking Alpha research.
Individual investors have been traditionally viewed as unsophisticated “noise”
traders who tend to spend less time on investment analysis, use different information
sources from their professional counterparts, and underperform standard benchmarks
(e.g., Kumar and Lee, 2006; Barber and Odean, 2013 review the literature). In recent
years, however, studies have uncovered evidence of informed trading by individuals,
with retail order flow predicting stock returns and future earnings announcement
surprises (Kaniel, Saar, and Titman, 2008; Kaniel et al., 2012; Kelley and Tetlock,
2013, 2017; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2017). Although the improved performance
of individual investors over time could be associated with learning or changing demo-
graphics, a key driver that remains unexplored is better access to investment research.
We begin by documenting that Seeking Alpha’s crowdsourced investor-authored
research is distinct from traditional Wall Street brokerage research. We analyze over
140,000 research articles for 4,000 stocks and find that after controlling for other
firm characteristics, Seeking Alpha coverage (number of articles) is higher among
1For example, early in the internet era SEC Commissioner Laura Unger anticipated technology’s
potential and concluded a speech with “It looks as though investors stand to benefit greatly from
the Information Revolution. The Internet has powered the revolution. It’s also been a key element
in the push for democratization of the flow of investment information.” (June 2000) https://www.
sec.gov/news/speech/spch387.htm
2https://seekingalpha.com/page/about_us
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firms with low institutional ownership and greater breadth of ownership, whereas the
opposite is true for brokerage research coverage. The differences highlight Seeking
Alpha’s emphasis on retail investor oriented research.
We find strong evidence that individual investors react to Seeking Alpha research.
Using trade and quote data from NYSE TAQ and the method of Boehmer, Jones,
and Zhang (2017) to identify retail investor trades, we find a significant increase in
retail trading on days with Seeking Alpha articles. Individuals also account for a
greater fraction of overall trading volume on article days, suggesting that individuals
react to Seeking Alpha research more than institutional investors do. In addition, we
find that retail order imbalances are strongly correlated with the sentiment of Seeking
Alpha research articles, with individual investors in aggregate being more likely to
purchase (sell) stock following positive (negative) articles.
More importantly, we find robust evidence that access to crowdsourced research
enhances the profitability of retail investor trades. In particular, the relation between
retail order flow and future stock returns is roughly twice as strong on days with
Seeking Alpha research articles. For example, a one standard deviation increase
in daily retail order imbalance is associated with future ten-day returns that are
0.09% larger on average, and yet this return differential increases to 0.18% on days
with Seeking Alpha articles and to 0.34% on days with articles written by high-skill
research contributors. We find no evidence of a return reversal, which is consistent
with individual investors becoming informed through their access to crowdsourced
research.
We benchmark retail investor behavior on days with Seeking Alpha articles against
their behavior on days with brokerage research. Although retail investors may have
access to consensus recommendations or forecasts, their access to detailed reports and
to the analysts themselves is less extensive than institutional investors. Accordingly,
we find weaker evidence of increased retail trading around days with brokerage re-
search revisions. Moreover, we find no evidence that retail investors trade profitably
around brokerage research revision days, indicating the limited value of brokerage
research to retail investors and highlighting the distinctiveness of crowdsourced in-
vestment research. We also find no evidence that retail investors trade more profitably
following stock-focused media articles, further underscoring the investment value of
Seeking Alpha.
Notably, we find the opposite pattern when examining how institutional investors
trade following these events. In particular, we find that institutional order flow is more
informed following brokerage research and media articles, consistent with superior
access to sell-side research and a greater capacity for processing public information.
On the other hand, we do not observe that institutional order flow is more informative
following Seeking Alpha articles, suggesting that crowdsourced investment research
provides unique information benefits to retail investors.
We next we explore the broader implications of crowdsourced research for the
firm’s information environment. We hypothesize that Seeking Alpha research reduces
information asymmetry among investors by decreasing the information advantage of
institutional investors over retail investors, and we test whether the reduction in in-
formation asymmetry is significant enough to translate into improved liquidity for
29
the firm. Our empirical strategy is to identify plausibly exogenous shocks to Seek-
ing Alpha coverage (similar to Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012). Specifically, we contend
that when an individual contributor departs from the platform altogether, the re-
sulting decline in Seeking Alpha coverage is exogenous, i.e. driven by a change in
the contributor’s personal circumstances rather than an expectation of a change in
the firm’s information environment. Consistent with the view that Seeking Alpha
contributor departures are exogenous events, we find no evidence that firms that ex-
perience departures also experience reductions in coverage by non-departing Seeking
Alpha contributors, brokerage firms, or the media.
We estimate the effects of an exogenous reduction in Seeking Alpha coverage on
firm-level measures of liquidity in the year following the event using a difference-in-
difference approach. Specifically, we define a firm as having experienced contributor
departure when 20% or more of the firm’s contributors depart Seeking Alpha in a
given year, and we match each treated firm to control firms that are in the same
size and book-to-market quintiles and experience no contributor departure. We find
that bid-ask spreads and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure increase by 2.4% and
5.5%, respectively, for contributor-departure firms relative to control firms, which is
consistent with the idea that reduced Seeking Alpha coverage results in lower liquidity.
The effects of contributor departures on liquidity are stronger among small firms,
those with greater retail ownership, and when the departing contributors possess
greater skill.
Our study contributes to a nascent but fast-growing literature on the role of
crowdsourced research in capital markets. We extend early studies that document
the role of crowdsourced research in predicting future returns and earnings (Chen et
al., 2014; Jame et al., 2016; Avery, Chevalier, and Zeckhauser, 2016) by document-
ing its role as a source of information specifically for retail investors. Our findings
that Seeking Alpha research encourages retail investor participation and helps retail
investors become more informed are consistent with crowdsourced research levelling
the informational playing field between institutional and retail investors.
Our analysis also adds to the literature that studies the performance of retail
investors. Early studies find the trading performance of retail investors to be subpar
due to behavioral biases, lack of sophistication, and poor access to information with
high investment value (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2000, Kumar and Lee, 2006; Frazzini
and Lamont, 2008; Hvidkjaer, 2008; Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009). On the other
hand, more recent work finds that retail investors as a group exhibit stock picking
ability and speculate that retail investors have valuable information gleaned from
geographic proximity to firms, relations with employees, or insights into customer
tastes (e.g. Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman, 2012; Kelley and Tetlock, 2013, 2017;
and Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2017). Our study is distinguished by its focus on
how retail investors become informed. We present results that link retail investors’
trading performance to the availability of retail-oriented investment research and
question the view that retail investors make investment decisions without requisite
investment analysis.
A third stream of literature examines the use of technology by regulators to level
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the informational playing field between institutional investors and retail investors.3
We complement these studies by examining the extent to which a technology-enabled
market innovation, Seeking Alpha, has democratized the flow of investment infor-
mation. Our findings illustrate how technological change can enable new business
models which improve retail investors’ access to information and level the informa-
tional playing field among investors.
2.2 The Seeking Alpha Sample
Seeking Alpha (SA) is one of the largest investment-related social media websites in
the US. In 2017, the site had more than 39 million monthly visits, with the average
visit lasting roughly 20 minutes (Seeking Alpha, 2018). The website relies on a
contributor network of over 15,000 individuals to publish opinion articles. Contributor
testimonials suggests that some of the primary motivations for contributing articles
include direct compensation from Seeking Alpha, feedback (via reader comments)
on investment theses, and increased recognition and visibility which may lead to
other professional opportunities.4 Chen, et al. (2014) find that Seeking Alpha’s
crowdsourced investment research contains valuable information, with articles and
user commentaries predicting future stock returns and earnings surprises.
We collect all opinion articles published between 2005 and 2017 on the Seeking
Alpha website. For each article, we collect the following information: article ID
(assigned by Seeking Alpha), title, main text, date of publication, author name, and
ticker (or tickers) assigned to each article. Following Chen et al., (2014) we limit the
sample to articles that are associated with one ticker. We further limit the sample to
common stocks (share codes 10 and 11) with available data in the CRSP-Compustat
merged database. Our final sample includes 156,513 single-ticker articles.
For each firm, we collect data on share price, shares outstanding, stock returns,
volume and closing bid and ask prices from CRSP. We obtain book value of equity,
book value of debt, book value of assets, the date of the initial public offering (IPO),
earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), and total
common shareholders from Compustat. We collect the number of shares held by
institutions from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (S34) database. We
obtain earnings announcement dates and sell-side analyst earnings forecast from the
IBES unadjusted US detail history file, sell-side analyst recommendations from the
IBES detail recommendation file, and earnings guidance from the IBES detail history
guidance file. Data on traditional media coverage, defined as Dow Jones News Service
articles, were graciously provided by Byoung-Hyoun Hwang for the period from 2005
3Examples are the launch of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system
(EDGAR) in 1993 (Asthana, Balsam, and Sankaraguruswamy, 2004; Gao and Huang, 2017), Reg-
ulation Fair Disclosure in 2000 (Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman, 2004; Duarte, Han,
Harford, and Young, 2008), and the mandated use of eXtensible Business Reporting Language
(XBRL) in corporate filing in 2009 (Blankespoor, Miller, and White, 2014; Bhattacharya, Cho,
and Kim, 2018).
4See: https://seekingalpha.com/page/testimonials.
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to 2012 (as in Chen et al, 2014), and we collect the data for the period from 2012 to
2017.
Table 2.1 describes the remarkable increase in the breadth and depth of Seeking
Alpha coverage over time. From 2005 to 2017, research coverage rose from 240 to
2,217; the number of research contributors grew from 38 to 1,995; and the number
of research articles increased from 282 to 19,505. In an average year, 1,208 unique
contributors publish 12,039 articles on 1,638 different companies. Conditional on
having Seeking Alpha coverage, the average firm has roughly 6.6 articles per year,
written by 4 different contributors.
2.3 Contrasting Seeking Alpha with Traditional Brokerage Research
In this section, we explore the attributes of Seeking Alpha research in relation to
traditional Wall Street research. Seeking Alpha’s business model is built on reaching
a wide audience of do-it-yourself investors, and Seeking Alpha contributors are often
individual investors. In contrast, prior survey evidence and empirical work suggests
that brokerage analysts cater to institutional investors. For example, Brown et al.
(2015) report that more than 80% of surveyed analysts view hedge funds and mutual
fund clients as very important, while only 13% of these analysts view retail clients
as important. Consistent with the survey evidence, several papers find that sell-side
research is strongly increasing in institutional ownership (see, e.g., Bhushan, 1989;
Green et al., 2014).
We examine the determinants of Seeking Alpha coverage and sell-side coverage by
estimating the following panel regression:
Coverageit = α + β1InstitutionalOwnrshpi,t−1 + β2BreadthofOwnrshpi,t−1
+ β × Chars+ Timet + it
(2.1)
where Coverage is the natural log of 1 plus the total number of unique Seeking
Alpha contributors writing at least one article for the stock during the calendar year
(SA Coverage), or the natural log of 1 plus the total number of unique brokerage
firms issuing at least one earnings forecast for the stock during the calendar year
(IBES Coverage).
The two independent variables of primary interest are Institutional Ownrshpi,t-1,
defined as the percentage of the firm’s shares held by institutional investors in year
t-1, and Breadth of Ownrshp, defined as the number of common shareholders (both
in logs). The vector of firm characteristics, Chars, includes: market capitalization
(Size), book to market (BM ), return volatility (Volatility), share turnover (Turnover),
past one-year return (Return), past one-year profitability (Profitability), and the
number of unique media articles mentioning the firm the prior year (Media Coverage).
See the Appendix for detailed definitions. We log all continuous variables other than
Profitability and Return, and standardize all variables to have zero mean and unit
variance. We include year fixed effects and cluster standard errors by firm.
Specification 1 of Table 2 examines the determinants of SA Coverage without
controlling for IBES Coverage. In general, SA Coverage is higher for larger firms,
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firms with more frequent media coverage, and those with greater trading volume.
In addition, SA Coverage is positively related to volatility, past one-year returns,
and profitability. Consistent with our conjecture that Seeking Alpha research is a
retail investor rather than an institutional investor phenomenon, we find a strong
negative relation between SA Coverage and institutional ownership and a strong
positive relation between SA Coverage and total common shareholders. In particular,
a one standard deviation increase in Institutional Ownership (Breadth of Ownership)
is associated with an 18% decline (3% increase) in SA Coverage. These findings
are robust to controlling for IBES Coverage, which is positively correlated with SA
Coverage (Specification 2).
Specifications 3 and 4 present analogous results for traditional coverage by sell-
side brokerage firms (IBES Coverage). As expected and in sharp contrast to the
SA Coverage patterns, IBES Coverage is strongly positively related to institutional
ownership and strongly negatively related to breadth of ownership. Collectively, these
results are consistent with the idea that Seeking Alpha tilts their research towards
stocks with greater retail ownership and a larger investor base, while traditional
brokerage research caters to institutional investors.
2.4 Do Retail Investors React to Seeking Alpha Research?
In this section, we examine two related predictions: 1) the dissemination of Seeking
Alpha research generates disproportionately greater trading among retail investors
(Section 2.4.1), and 2) the tone of the Seeking Alpha research article influences retail
investor order imbalances (Section 2.4.2).
2.4.1 Retail Trading Intensity around Seeking Alpha Research
We identify retail trading using Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang’s (2017) approach,
which exploits two key institutional features of retail trading. First, most equity
trades by retail investors take place off-exchange, either filled from the broker’s own
inventory or sold by the broker to wholesalers (Battalio, Cowin, and Jennings, 2016).
TAQ classifies these types of trades with exchange code “D.” Accordingly, we identify
retail trades by limiting our analysis to trades executed on exchange code “D.”
Second, retail traders typical receive a small fraction of a cent price improvement
over the National Best Bid or Offer (NBBO) for market orders (ranging from 0.01
to 0.2 cents), while institutional orders tend to be executed at whole or half-cent
increments. Thus, we follow Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017) (BJZ) and identify
trades as retail purchases (sales) if the trade took place at a price just below (above)
a round penny.5 The BJZ approach is conservative in the sense that it has a low
type 1 error (i.e., trades classified as retail are very likely to be retail). While this
approach does omit some retail trading including nonmarketable limit orders and
5This approach focuses on liquidity-demanding retail trading (market orders). Kelley and Tet-
lock (2013) find that while both aggressive and passive retail trading predicts returns, liquidity-
demanding trading also predicts earnings surprises.
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retail traders that take place on registered exchanges, it “picks up a majority of
overall retail trading activity” (BJZ page 6).6
We consider two complementary measures of retail trading intensity: Retail
Turnoverit, which is the total trading volume in stock i on day t classified as retail,
scaled by stock i ’s shares outstanding, and Percentage Retail Turnover, which is the
total trading volume in stock i on day t classified as retail, scaled by aggregate trading
volume for stock i on day t. The turnover measure allows us to examine whether retail
investors trade more following Seeking Alpha research than at other times, whereas
the percentage turnover measure considers whether the increase in trading following
SA research is larger for retail investors than for institutional investors. We estimate
the effects of Seeking Alpha research on retail investor trading using the following
daily panel regression:
RetailT radingit = α + β1SAit−1,t + β2IBESit−1,t + β3Mediat−1,t
+ β4Charsiy−1 + Timet + Firmi + it
(2.2)
where Retail Trading is Retail Turnover or Percentage Retail Turnover, SAit is
equal to one if Seeking Alpha issued a research report for firm i on day t or t-1,7 and
IBES and Media are defined similarly. Char includes Size, book-to-market (BM ),
Institutional Ownership, Volatility, Turnover, Return, Profitability, IBES coverage,
and Media Coverage, all measured at the end of the previous year. Detailed variable
descriptions are provided in the Appendix. All continuous independent variables are
standardized to have mean zero and unit variance. Time and Firm indicate time
(calendar day) and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm.
Our TAQ sample begins in 2007, and we consider all firm-years with Seeking
Alpha coverage (at least one SA research report). We exclude dates that coincide
with earnings announcements or earnings guidance to reduce the likelihood that SA
research is merely proxying for information contained in these information events.
The resulting 2007-2017 sample comprises 3,925,070 firm-day observations.
Specifications 1 and 3 of Table 2.3 report the results prior to including firm fixed
effects. The statistically significant positive coefficient on SAt-1,t in Specification 1
indicates that retail investors trade more following Seeking Alpha research than on
other days. Moreover, the significant positive coefficient in Specification 3 confirms
that the increase in trading for retail investors is greater than for institutional in-
vestors, with retail investors comprising a larger fraction of the daily turnover follow-
ing Seeking Alpha research. The results also hold after including firm fixed effects in
Specifications 2 and 4.
Table 2.3 also provides evidence that trading intensity is greater following the
release of traditional brokerage research or media coverage, although the economic
6BJZ also note that in a conference discussion of their work, Eric Kelley presented that the correla-
tion between the BJZ order imbalance measure and imbalances calculated from Kelley and Tetlock
(2013)’s proprietary retail data with observed trade directions is in the range of 0.345 to 0.507,
with an average of 0.452.
7We include day t-1 to account for SA reports published after the close of trading on day t-1. We
analyze trading days separately in Table 2.4.
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magnitudes are considerably smaller. For example, the coefficient on the SA indicator
variable in Specification 3 (1.31%) is roughly 4 times larger than the coefficient on
the IBES indicator (0.34%) and more than 50% larger than Media (0.69%), and the
relative differences become even larger after controlling for firm fixed effects.
2.4.2 Retail Order Imbalances and Seeking Alpha Research Article Sen-
timent
To provide more direct evidence that retail investors read and react to Seeking Alpha
research, we explore the relation between retail order imbalances and SA research
sentiment. We consider two sentiment measures. The first is based on article tone:
Percent Negativeit (Percent Positiveit) is the average fraction of negative (positive)
words across all single-ticker articles published on Seeking Alpha about company i on
day t (Chen et al., 2014). We use the word list compiled by Loughran and McDonald
(2011) to classify words as negative or positive. The second is based on a contributor’s
investment position, as disclosed in the article: Short (Long) Positionit is one when
a contributor discloses short (long) the stock (Campbell et al., 2016).8 When several
contributors disclose investment positions, we take a simple average.
For reference, we also examine the relation between retail order imbalances and
brokerage research and traditional media coverage. We create indicator variables for
Long (Short) brokerage research, defined as IBES recommendation upgrades (down-
grades) or positive (negative) earnings forecast revisions. We also calculate the tone
of traditional media articles using the Percent Negativeit and Percent Positiveit mea-
sures, as defined above.
For all firm-days with at least one event (i.e., Seeking Alpha article, IBES report,
or media article) we estimate the following panel regression:
RetailOIBi,t+x = α + β1SA+ β2SA× PercentNegativeit
+ β3SA× PercentPositiveitβ4SA× ShortPositionit
+ β5SA× LongPositionit + β6IBES
+ β7IBES × Long + β8IBES × Short+ β9Media
+ β10Media× PercentNegativeit
+ β11Media× PercentPositiveit
+ β12InstOIBit + β13Chariy−1 + Timet + it.
(2.3)
As in Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017), Retail OIBi,t+x is defined as the retail
buy volume less the retail sell volume, scaled by the total retail trading volume
for firm i on day t+x. We define day t as the event day (the day the Seeking
Alpha article is published) and let x vary from -3 to +3. By focusing on a seven-
day window around the event, we are able to examine the lead-lag relation between
Seeking Alpha research and retail investor trading. To control for broad omitted
factors that affect the order imbalances of all investors, we also include Inst OIB,
8The site has mandated investment position disclosures since 2015.
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which is defined as the total order imbalance across all TAQ trades less the retail
order imbalance.9 Char is a vector of firm characteristics (taken from BJZ) and
includes past one-week returns (Retw-1), past one month returns (Retm-1), returns
over the prior two to seven months (Retm-7,m-2), market capitalization (Size), monthly
turnover (Turnover), monthly volatility of daily returns (Volatility), and book-to-
market (BM ). With the exception of returns, all control variables are measured at
the end of the previous year and are in natural logs. To control for confounding
events, we exclude Seeking Alpha articles that coincide with earnings announcements,
earnings guidance, or brokerage (IBES) investment research (forecast revisions or
recommendation changes).
Table 2.4 presents the results. We find robust evidence that Seeking Alpha article
sentiment tone predicts retail order imbalances on event days 0 and +1. For example,
a one-standard deviation increase in SA Percent Negative Words is associated with
a 1.17 % and 1.05% decline in Retail OIB on days 0 and 1.10 On these days, the
incremental effect of short positions is a decline in Retail OIB of 6.75% and 6.41%,
respectively, whereas the incremental effect of long positions is 3.83% and 2.15%.
Short position disclosures and negative SA tone continue to have a discernible effect
on Retail OIB on days +2 and +3. We find no evidence that retail order imbalances
on event days -3 or -2 predicts the sentiment of future Seeking Alpha articles, although
there is some evidence that Retail OIB on day -1 is related to negative article tone
and the disclosure of short positions.
We also find that retail investors react to IBES research and media coverage, yet
the economic magnitudes of these effects are smaller than for Seeking Alpha research.
For example, while the cumulative effects of SA×Long and SA×Short on Retail OIB
in the two days surrounding the event are 5.98% and -13.16%, the corresponding
estimates for IBES×Long and IBES×Short are 4.22% and -1.03%. Moreover, the
effect of SA Percent Negative on retail order imbalances in the same event window is
twice that of Media Percent Negative (-2.22 versus -1.19).
In summary, our findings thus far indicate that Seeking Alpha research is geared
towards stocks that are owned by retail investors. Moreover, the publication of SA
articles stimulates significant trading by retail investors that is directionally consistent
with the tone of the article. Given the evidence that Seeking Alpha research tone
is informative about future stock returns (Chen et al., 2014), these findings suggest
that Seeking Alpha research may also facilitate more informed trading among retail
investors. We explore this hypothesis next.
9Our trade-based classification approach provides an imperfect measure of all retail trading, and
therefore calculating the total order imbalance less the retail order imbalance also provides an
imperfect measure of all institutional trading.
10The absence of a relation between Retail OIB and SA Percent Positive Words is consistent with
prior evidence that negative words are better at capturing variation in tone (e.g., Tetlock, 2007).
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2.5 Does Seeking Alpha Research Help Retail Investors Become Better
Informed?
We examine the informativeness of retail order imbalances on days in which Seeking
Alpha research is published by estimating the following panel regression:
Retit,t+x = α + β1RetailOIBit + β2InstOIBit + β3SAit + β4RetailOIB × SAit
+ β5InstOIBit × SAit + β6Mediait + β7RetailOIB ×Mediait
+ β8InstOIB ×Mediait + β9IBESit + β10RetailOIB × IBESit
+ β11InstOIB × IBESit + β13Chariy−1 + Timet + it
(2.4)
where Retit+1,t+x is the return on stock i from the close of day t to the close of
day t+x, with x equal to 1, 5, or 10; Retail OIB is the total retail buy volume less
the total retail sell volume, scaled by the total retail trading volume; Inst OIB is
the total non-retail buy volume less the total non-retail sell volume, scaled by the
total non-retail trading volume; and SAit is equal to one if there is a SA research
article on firm i on day t or t-1, and zero otherwise. Our primary variable of interest,
Retail OIB×SA, captures the incremental informativeness of retail order imbalance
on days with Seeking Alpha research. Institutional OIB×SA captures the incremental
informativeness of institutional trading on days with Seeking Alpha research. Mediait
is equal to one if there is a traditional media article for firm i on day t or t-1, and
zero otherwise. Similarly constructed, IBESit indicates the distribution of sell-side
research. Characteristics is the vector of firm characteristic described in Equation
(2.3). We exclude firm-days that coincide with earnings announcements or earnings
guidance and standardize all continuous variables, as in Section 4. We include time
fixed effects and double cluster standard errors by date (calendar day) and firm.
Table 2.5 presents the results. Consistent with Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017),
we find that retail order imbalance is a strong positive predictor of future returns.
Moreover, we find that retail trading is a stronger return predictor on days with Seek-
ing Alpha research. For example, in Specification 3, a one standard deviation increase
in retail order imbalance is associated with a 0.09% increase in 10-days returns on
days without Seeking Alpha research and an increase of 0.18% (0.09% +0.09%) on
days with Seeking Alpha research. In contrast, the coefficients on Retail OIB×Media
and Retail OIB×IBES are always economically and statistically insignificant, which
further highlights the unique role of Seeking Alpha research (relative to traditional
media and brokerage research) in enhancing the informativeness of retail investor
trades. We also find that when retail investor trading is more informed, institu-
tional investor trading tends to be less informed. Specifically, Institutional OIB is
a stronger predictor of future returns on days when traditional media articles and
sell-side research are distributed but not on days when SA articles are published.
Finally, in Figure 1 we estimate Equation (2.3) for x=10, 20, and 60 and plot
the estimates of Retail, Retail OIB×SA, Retail OIB×Media, and Retail OIB×IBES.
Consistent with Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017), we find that the informativeness
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of retail trading is concentrated over relatively short holding periods. In each case,
more than 50% of the 60-day returns accrue in the first ten days. The patterns are
similar but economically smaller for non-event days and days with media articles
or IBES research. The lack of reversal is inconsistent with the view that returns
following retail trading reflect uninformed price pressure.
2.5.1 Retail Order Imbalances and Stock Returns: Robustness
In the Internet Appendix (Table IA.1), we confirm that the evidence regarding the
incremental informativeness of retail order imbalances around Seeking Alpha research
is robust to several alternative methodological choices including: (1) measuring retail
order imbalances using number of trades instead of share volume; (2) including in the
sample firm-days with earnings news (earnings announcements or earning guidance);
(3) adding firm fixed effects to the panel regression; and (4) using Fama-MacBeth
regressions to estimate Equation (2.4).11
We explore whether the results are stable over time by estimating Equation (2.4)
each month (Specification 3 in Table 2.5) and we plot the cumulative coefficients
on Retail OIB×SA in Figure IA.1. We observe a jump in the second half of 2008,
consistent with SA research being particularly valuable during the financial crisis,
and a fairly stable and positive drift over the full sample period. To confirm that our
results are not driven by the financial crisis period, we re-estimate the model after
excluding the second half of 2008, and continue to find that the coefficient on Retail
OIB × SA is statistically significant at a 5% level.
2.5.2 Conditioning on Firm Size and Contributor Skill
We examine whether Seeking Alpha research is more useful to retail investors for
smaller stocks, which are known to be less informationally efficient. Specifically, we
sort firms into two groups based on the median breakpoint of market capitalization
(measured at the end of the previous year). We then repeat Specification 3 of Table
2.5 for each size group separately. Panel A of Table 2.6 reports the coefficient on
Retail OIB×SA for each size subgroup. Among smaller stocks, the incremental prof-
itability of retail order flow associated with Seeking Alpha research is 0.17 % over a
10-day holding period and statistically significant, compared to the 0.09% coefficient
on Retail OIB ( unreported). In contrast, among larger stocks the incremental in-
formativeness of retail trading on days with Seeking Alpha research is considerably
smaller. For example, the coefficient on Retail OIB over a 10-day horizon is 0.02%
and the coefficient on Retail OIB×SA is 0.04%, neither of which is statistically dif-
ferent from zero. The findings suggest that the impact of Seeking Alpha research on
the informativeness of retail trading is concentrated among smaller stocks.
We suggest that retail investors will benefit more from research written by skilled
Seeking Alpha contributors. Motivated by the idea that research by skilled individuals
11In estimating Fama-Macbeth regressions, we limit the sample to days with at least 10 firms with
Seeking Alpha research, and we calculate Newey West standard errors with 1, 5, and 10-day lags
depending on the return horizon.
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has greater market impact, we proxy for contributor skill by averaging the two-day
(0, 1) absolute market-adjusted returns across the last five articles written by the
contributor. We partition the sample into high versus low skill based on the median
breakpoint of contributor skill, and we use indicator variables to separate event days
where the fraction of articles written by high skill contributors is greater than 50%
(High Skill) from those where it is less than or equal to 50% (Low Skill).
The results are presented in Panel B of Table 2.6. The coefficients on Retail
OIB×SA High Skill are highly significant, ranging from 0.11% for a one-day event
window to 0.25% for the 10-day window. In contrast, the coefficients on Retail
OIB×SA Low Skill are small and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, across
all holding periods, the difference between the two estimates is significantly differ-
ent from zero. The link between contributor skill and the extent to which retail
order imbalance is informative about future returns is consistent with more informed
investment research leading to more informed retail trading.
2.6 Seeking Alpha Research, Information Asymmetry, and Firm Liquid-
ity
The evidence in the previous section suggests that Seeking Alpha disseminates
investment information to retail investors who would not otherwise have access to
the information. If crowdsourced investment research leads to a material reduction
in the level of information asymmetry between institutions and individuals, then
Seeking Alpha coverage should improve firm liquidity. In this section, we explore the
broader implications of crowdsourced research for the firm’s information environment.
Our approach focuses on exogenous shocks to Seeking Alpha coverage, and we study
the effects of declines in coverage on measures of firm liquidity.
2.6.1 Identifying Exogenous Shocks to Seeking Alpha Coverage
Studying the effects of Seeking Alpha coverage on firm liquidity is difficult because
SA contributors choose which stocks to cover, and the choice to cover a stock is
likely influenced by many firm characteristics including liquidity itself. We attempt
to circumvent this challenge by identifying changes in Seeking Alpha coverage that
are unlikely to be driven by firm characteristics. Specifically, our identification strat-
egy focuses on the departure of a Seeking Alpha contributor from Seeking Alpha.
Our underlying assumption is that when a contributor leaves the platform, the re-
sulting decline in SA coverage of a firm is exogenous, i.e., unrelated to contributor’s
expectation of how the firm’s environment will change.
We define a Seeking Alpha contributor as departing if she covered at least five
stocks in year t and no stocks subsequently. We require that contributors cover at
least 5 stocks to reduce the likelihood that the departure is related to the fundamentals
of the firms being covered. Of the 5,756 Seeking Alpha contributors covering at least
five stocks from 2004-2016, roughly 21% (1,201) depart Seeking Alpha. The average
departing contributor writes 22 articles for 16 unique stocks in the year prior to their
departure.
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A firm experiences a Contributor Departureit in year t if at least 20% of its existing
contributors leave in year t.12 We compare treated firms to candidate control firms
that did not experience any departures using a difference-in-difference approach, and
we require that both treated and controls firms have had coverage on Seeking Alpha
for at least three years. Panel A of Table 2.7 reports summary statistics. The
sample consists of 1,900 firms-years with contributor departures and 8,408 control
firms-years. For both groups, we report the ∆Log (SA Coverage) in year t, defined
as Log (1+SA Coverageit) – Log (1+SA Coverageit-1). We observe that control firms
experience a roughly 14% increase in coverage on average, whereas firms experiencing
contributor departure experience a roughly 20% decline in Seeking Alpha coverage.
Firms experiencing contributor departure also tend to be slightly larger and more
growth-oriented than control firms.
If the choice to depart Seeking Alpha is unrelated to firm i ’s informational envi-
ronment, then we should not observe a decline in the coverage of firm i by remaining
Seeking Alpha contributors, sell-side analysts, or the media. To help validate the
assumption that Seeking Alpha contributor departures are exogenous, we examine
the relation between contributor departures and changes in total SA coverage (SA
Coverage), coverage by remaining SA contributors (Non-Departing SA Coverage),
sell-side analyst coverage (IBES Coverage), and media coverage (Media Coverage),
the latter defined as the total number of traditional media articles in a year.
We estimate the following panel regression:
∆(LogCoverageit) = α + β1ContributorDepartureit + βCharacteristicsi,t−1
+ Time× Styleit + it,
(2.5)
where ∆ denotes the change from year t-1 to t, and Characteristics is the vector
of firm characteristics included in Equation (2.1), with each variable standardized
to have zero mean and unit variance. Time×Styleit is a vector of time × style
indicator variables, where the style indicators are the 25 size and book-to-market
groups as constructed in Daniel et al. (1997). Specifically, we first sort stocks into
five quintiles based on NYSE breakpoints, and then within each size quintile, we
further sort stocks into quintiles based on book-to-market. By including Time×Style
indicator variables, we effectively follow the approach of Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012)
which matches treated firms to control firms in the same year, size quintile, and
book-to-market quintile.13 Standard errors are clustered by firm and time.
In Specification 1 in Panel B of Table 2.7, we find that firms with Seeking Alpha
contributor departures experience an economically and statistically significant 35%
decline in SA coverage relative to matched control firms, validating the relevance
of the Contributor Departure instrument. On the other hand, in Specification 2
we observe that treated firms experience a significant increase in coverage by non-
departing SA contributors, inconsistent with the idea that departures are related to
firm conditions. In addition, Specifications 3-4 show no significant change in IBES
12Our results are similar if we change the cutoff for treated firms to 10%, 15%, or 25%.
13We find similar after including only time fixed effects.
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Coverage or Media Coverage following Seeking Alpha contributor departures. The
evidence in Panel B helps validate the key assumption that contributor departures
are exogenous to the information environment of the firm.
2.6.2 Seeking Alpha Coverage and Firm Liquidity
We examine the relation between Seeking Alpha coverage and information asym-
metry using the following panel regression:
∆Illiquidityit = α + β1ContributorDepartureit
+ β2∆Log(Non−DepartingSACoverageit)
+ β3∆Log(IBESCoverageit) + β4∆Log(MediaCoverage)
+ βChar + Time× Styleit + it.
(2.6)
where Illiquidity is the percentage bid-ask spread (Bid-Ask) or the Amihud (2002)
illiquidity ratio (Amihud Illiquidity), both measured in natural logs and at the monthly
frequency (by averaging all daily observations in the month).14 We define ∆Illiquidityit
as the difference between Illiquidityit
and Illiquidityit-12. ∆Contributor Departure, Characteristics, and Time×Style
are defined as in Equation (2.5). ∆Log (Non-Departing SA Coverage), ∆ Log (IBES
Coverage), and ∆ Log (Media Coverage) are proxies for changes in investor interest,
defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time.
Specifications 1 and 2 of Table 2.8 report the difference-in-difference estimates
for bid-ask spreads. The coefficient on Contributor Departure in Specification 1 in-
dicates that relative to a portfolio of control firms matched on size, book-to-market,
and year, firms with departing contributors experience a 3.45% increase in bid-ask
spreads. The estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level and economically
meaningful, translating into roughly 7% of the cross-sectional standard deviation of
the change in bid-ask spreads (50%). Specification 2 confirms that the results are
robust to controlling for changes in investor interest and firm characteristics. Speci-
fications 3 and 4 present analogous results for the Amihud illiquidity measure. After
including all the controls, we find a difference-in-difference of 5.15% for the Ami-
hud illiquidity measure. The change in illiquidity is roughly 6% of its cross-sectional
standard deviation of 87%.
We next examine the relation between contributor departures and changes in firm
liquidity in event time. Specifically, we re-estimate Specifications 2 and 4 of Table
2.8, varying the timing of Contributor Departure from Contributor Departurei,t-2 to
Contributor Departurei,t+2. That is, we examine the results in event time from year
-2 to +2, where year 0 is the baseline Specification reported in Table 2.8. Figure
2 reports the results for Bid-Ask and Amihud Illiquidity, respectively. We find no
significant changes in Bid-Ask or Amihud Illiquidity in the two years prior to the
event, in support of the parallels trends assumption. As shown in Table 2.8, both
liquidity measures significantly decline in year 0 (the first year after the departure of
14Results are similar if we aggregate illiquidity to an annual frequency.
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Seeking Alpha contributors), and year 1. The two-year cumulative increase in Bid-
Ask Spread (Amihud Illiquidity) is 4.84% (10.27%), which suggests that the decline
in coverage has long-lived consequences for firm liquidity. Finally, we find that the
change in illiquidity for both measures is small and statistically insignificant in event
year 2.
6.3 Conditioning on Firm Size, Retail Ownership, and Contributor Skill
In this section, we explore whether the effect of Seeking Alpha coverage on liq-
uidity depends on firm and contributor characteristics. The evidence in Table 2.6
is consistent with Seeking Alpha research being particularly valuable among smaller
stocks and when the research is written by more skilled contributors. We suggest that
the effect of contributor departure is more pronounced among stocks with greater re-
tail ownership, where Seeking Alpha is likely a relatively more important information
source, and when the departing contributor has greater skill.
Panel A of Table 2.9 examines whether the effect of departing contributors on
liquidity varies with retail ownership by splitting the sample into two groups based on
the median breakpoint of institutional ownership. Among firms with low institutional
ownership, we estimate that firms with Contributor Departures experience a 5.26%
increase in Bid-Ask Spreads and a 12.27% increase in the Amihud illiquidity measure,
both of which are highly significant. In contrast, among firms in the bottom half
of retail ownership, the coefficients on Contributor Departure for both illiquidity
measures are statistically insignificant and economically small. Furthermore, the
coefficient estimates across the two samples are significantly different from each other.
These findings support our conjecture that the effects of Seeking Alpha on information
asymmetry are much stronger among stocks heavily owned by retail investors.
Panel B splits the sample into two groups based on the median breakpoint of
market capitalization. We find consistent evidence of a liquidity decline for small
firms. In particular, there is a marginally significant 3.95% increase in bid-ask spreads
(p <0.10) and a highly significant 9.28% increase in Amihud illiquidity for small firms,
with no evidence of a decline in liquidity for large firms.
Finally, Panel C sorts firms into two groups based on contributor skill as in Ta-
ble 2.6. We find economically large and statistically significant increases in bid-ask
spreads and Amihud liquidity when departing contributors have high skill. The re-
sults are weaker when departing contributors have low skill, and the differences in
coefficient estimates between the two groups are significant at the 10% level. Col-
lectively, the results in Table 2.9 confirm our conjecture that exogenous departures
of Seeking Alpha contributors have a greater effect on firm liquidity for firms with
greater retail ownership, smaller firms, and when a large fraction of departing con-
tributors are highly skilled.
2.7 Conclusion
Individual investors are typically at an information disadvantage relative to profes-
sional investors. In recent years, innovations in technology have helped spur the
democratization of investment research, with the popular provider of informative
crowdsourced research Seeking Alpha playing a central role (Chen et al., 2014). In
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this article, we explore the extent to which crowdsourced investment research has
helped level the information playing field by studying the effects of Seeking Alpha
investment research on investor decision-making and the information environment of
the firm.
We confirm anecdotal evidence by showing that Seeking Alpha research is geared
towards retail investors, with Seeking Alpha coverage being significantly negatively
related to institutional ownership and positively related to number of shareholders.
We find significant increases in trading activity by retail investors on days with Seek-
ing Alpha articles, with retail order imbalances being significantly related to the tone
of research articles. More importantly, we find that Seeking Alpha research enhances
the profitability of retail investor trades. In particular, the relation between retail
order flow and future stock returns is roughly twice as strong on days with Seeking
Alpha research articles. In contrast, we find no evidence that the informativeness of
retail order flow strengthens on days when brokerage research is distributed, which is
consistent with retail investors having more limited access to traditional Wall Street
research. We also find no evidence that retail investors trade more profitably on days
with media articles, highlighting the value of Seeking Alpha as a source of investment
research.
We find that the democratization of investment research has helped improve mar-
ket liquidity, which is consistent with a reduction in information asymmetry between
retail investors and institutional investors. Our identification strategy relies on the
idea that the departure of a Seeking Alpha contributor from the platform represents
a plausibly exogenous shock to Seeking Alpha research coverage. Using a difference-
in-difference approach, we find that the bid-ask spreads and the Amihud (2002) illiq-
uidity measure increase by 2.4% and 5.5% in the year after contributor departures.
These results are stronger among small firms, those with greater retail ownership,
and when the departing contributors possess greater skill.
We conclude that a recent technology-induced innovation, the crowdsourcing of
investment research, has helped to level the informational playing field between re-
tail and institutional investors. We acknowledge, however, that not all innovations
in information access work to level the information playing field. Many new sources
of information target professional investors, and active portfolio managers expend
tremendous resources to acquire investment information from Fin Tech companies
(e.g. Grennan and Michaely, 2018). While Zhu (2018) finds evidence that these new
sources of information help institutional investors better monitor company manage-
ment, they may also work to increase information asymmetry between individuals
and institutions.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for the Seeking Alpha Research Article Sample
The table reports information on Seeking Alpha research articles by year. The sample includes 156,513 single-ticker research
articles written by 8,463 unique contributors for which the referenced stock is available in the CRSP-Compustat merged database.
Average in the bottom row denotes the average across years.
Year
Firms Covered
by Seeking
Alpha
Fraction of
CRSP/Compustat
Universe with
Coverage
Seeking Alpha
Articles
Seeking Alpha
Contributors
Contributor
-Firm Pairs
Articles per
Contributor
Articles per
Contributor
-Firm Pair
2005 240 5.04% 828 38 325 3.45 1.35
2006 923 19.78% 3,130 245 2,192 3.39 2.37
2007 1,437 31.16% 7,368 561 4,448 5.13 3.1
2008 1,179 26.12% 5,120 704 3,321 4.34 2.82
2009 1,235 28.95% 7,373 746 4,176 5.97 3.38
2010 1,368 33.94% 7,007 743 4,209 5.12 3.08
2011 1,338 34.53% 7,093 945 4,700 5.3 3.51
2012 1,799 48.13% 18,905 1,582 11,278 10.51 6.27
2013 2,322 64.32% 17,550 1,982 11,683 7.56 5.03
2014 2,359 65.40% 21,498 2,087 13,260 9.11 5.62
2015 2,607 69.76% 22,414 2,059 13,734 8.6 5.27
2016 2,274 61.66% 18,722 2,015 10,982 8.23 4.83
2017 2,217 62.22% 19,505 1,995 11,545 8.8 5.21
Average 1,638 42.39% 12,039 1,208 7,373 6.58 3.99
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Table 2.2: Determinants of Research Coverage by Seeking Alpha and IBES
The table presents the results from the following panel regression:
Coverageit = α + β1Institutional Ownershpi,t−1 + β2Breadth of Ownershipi,t−1
+ β × Characteristicss+ Timet + it
In Specifications 1 and 2, Coverage is defined as the natural log of 1 plus the total
number of Seeking Alpha contributors who contribute at least one article for the stock
during the calendar year (SA Coverage). In Specifications 3 and 4, it is the natural log
of 1 plus the total number of brokerage firms that issue at least one earnings forecast
for the stock during the calendar year (IBES Coverage). Institutional Ownershipi,t-1
is the percentage of the firm’s shares held by institutional investors at the end of
the previous year, and Breadth of Ownership is the number of common sharehold-
ers. Chari,t-1 is a vector of firm characteristic controls. Detailed descriptions of the
variables are presented in Appendix A. The continuous variables with the exception
of Return and Profitability are in natural logs, and all variables are standardized to
have mean zero and unit variance. All specifications include year fixed effects and
standard errors are clustered by firm, with t-statistics reported in parentheses below
the corresponding coefficient estimates. The sample spans 2005-2017 and consists of
42,316 firm-year observations with 5,849 unique firm clusters.
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Table 2.2, continued
Log (SA Coverage) Log (IBES Coverage)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Institutional Ownership -0.18 -0.19 0.15 0.16
(-16.27) (-17.12) (15.50) (15.83)
Log (Breadth of Ownership) 0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.07
(3.13) (3.52) (-9.91) (-10.05)
Log (Size) 0.35 0.31 0.67 0.66
(20.29) (15.85) (49.26) (46.84)
Log (BM) -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(-1.49) (-1.80) (-0.12) (-0.05)
Log (Vol) 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.04
(13.19) (13.06) (5.41) (4.92)
Log (Turn) 0.08 0.06 0.31 0.30
(7.75) (5.90) (24.40) (24.21)
Return 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04
(2.44) (2.29) (4.30) (4.19)
Profitability 0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(5.06) (5.45) (-6.71) (-6.96)
Log (Media Coverage) 0.30 0.29 0.04 0.03
(25.46) (25.12) (7.26) (5.45)
Log (IBES Coverage) 0.07 -0.04
(5.32) (-4.35)
Log (SA Coverage) 0.03
(5.36)
Fixed Effects Time Time Time Time
R-squared 45.69 45.81 76.79 76.85
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Table 2.3: Seeking Alpha Research Coverage and Retail Investor Trading
The table presents the results from the following daily panel regression:
RetailT radingit = α + β1SAit−1,t + β2IBESit−1,t + β3Mediat−1,t
+ β4Charsiy−1 + Timet + Firmi + it
In Specifications 1 and 2, Retail Tradingit denotes Retail Turnoverit, which is
1 plus the total retail trading volume in stock i on day t, scaled by stock i’s shares
outstanding, measured in natural logs. In Specifications 3 and 4, it denotes Percentage
Retail Turnover, which is the total retail trading volume in stock i on day t, scaled by
the aggregate trading volume in stock i on day t. SAit-1,t is a dummy variable equal to
one if Seeking Alpha issued a research report for firm i on day t or t-1. IBESit-1,t is a
dummy variable equal to one if IBES issued a research report for firm i on day t or t-1,
and Mediait-1,t is a dummy variable equal to one if firm i was mentioned in traditional
media article on day t or t-1. Char is a vector of firm characteristics measured at the
end of the previous year. More details are available in the Appendix. All continuous
independent variables are standardized to have mean zero and unit variance. Time
and Firm indicate time (calendar day) and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by firm.
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Table 2.3, continued
Retail Turnover Percent Retail Turnover
[1] [2] [3] [4]
SA 0.15 0.13 1.09 0.62
(15.07) (24.09) (14.77) (20.39)
IBES 0.09 0.08 0.30 0.06
(24.08) (48.98) (8.81) (5.81)
Media 0.07 0.09 0.69 0.12
(5.86) (18.57) (7.35) (4.45)
Log (Size) -0.10 -0.12 -2.91 -3.79
(-7.61) (-7.55) (-21.09) (-19.84)
Log (BM) 0.01 -0.03 -0.24 -0.16
(1.33) (-5.11) (-3.71) (-2.34)
Inst Ownership -0.09 -0.01 -2.70 -0.95
(-16.34) (-1.75) (-31.19) (-10.14)
Log (Breadth of Ownership) 0.00 0.01 0.37 0.22
(-0.54) (1.30) (6.08) (1.65)
Log (Vol) 0.10 0.07 0.66 0.46
(12.59) (10.82) (6.78) (6.15)
Log (Turn) 0.17 0.12 0.70 0.22
(8.15) (12.93) (5.63) (2.23)
Return 0.01 0.01 -0.54 -0.36
(2.04) (2.12) (-7.59) (-5.96)
Profitability -0.03 0.00 -0.70 0.02
(-5.93) (0.17) (-11.94) (0.23)
Log (IBES Coverage) 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.01
(1.00) (1.56) (-0.30) (0.08)
Log (SA Coverage) 0.06 0.01 0.75 0.06
(9.90) (3.55) (14.06) (1.35)
Log (Media Coverage) 0.03 0.02 0.50 0.22
(5.55) (5.44) (8.61) (5.34)
Fixed Effects Time Time & Firm Time Time & Firm
Observations 3,925,070 3,925,070 3,676,764 3,676,764
R-squared 27.47 46.13 35.17 47.33
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Table 2.4: Seeking Alpha Article Tone and Retail Investor Order Imbalance
This table presents results from the following regression:
RetailOIBi,t+x = α + β1SA+ β2SA× PercentNegativeit
+ β3SA× PercentPositiveitβ4SA× ShortPositionit
+ β5SA× LongPositionit + β6IBES
+ β7IBES × Long + β8IBES × Short+ β9Media
+ β10Media× PercentNegativeit
+ β11Media× PercentPositiveit
+ β12InstOIBit + β13Chariy−1 + Timet + it.
Retail OIBi,t+x is defined as retail buy volume less retail sell volume, scaled by
total retail trading volume for firm i on day t+x, where t is the event day and x varies
from -3 to 3. SA is a dummy equal to one if Seeking Alpha published an article for
firm i on day t; IBES and Media are defined analogously. Percent Negit (Posit ) is
the average fraction of negative (positive) words across SA (or media) articles about
company i on day t. SA Short (Long) Disclosureit equals one if the SA author is
short (long) the stock, IBES Short equals one if the IBES report is negative (i.e., a
recommendation downgrade or negative forecast revision), and IBES Long equals one
if the IBES report is positive. Chars is a vector of firm characteristics that includes
Turnover, Volatility, Size, and BM, all measured at the end of the previous year,
and returns measured over the past week, month, and past two to seven months.
More details are available in the Appendix. All continuous independent variables
are in natural logs (with the exception of returns) and standardized to have mean
zero and unit variance. Each regression includes time (calendar day) fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by firm, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses
below the corresponding coefficient estimates. The sample includes 45,084 stock-day
observations over the period 2007-2017.
49
Table 2.4, continued
Retail Order Imbalance by Event Day
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
SA 2.80% 4.35% 5.06% 6.52% 5.34% 2.39% 3.34%
(2.20) (4.05) (4.96) (6.06) (5.00) (1.77) (2.45)
SA × Percent Negative -0.34% -0.26% -0.41% -1.17% -1.05% -0.40% -0.50%
(-1.62) (-1.37) (-2.18) (-5.52) (-4.97) (-1.89) (-2.38)
SA × Percent Positive 0.33% -0.13% 0.03% 0.08% 0.35% 0.25% -0.15%
(1.29) (-0.58) (0.12) (0.31) (1.47) (0.92) (-0.55)
SA × Short Position -0.85% -3.08% -4.14% -6.75% -6.41% -4.33% -2.94%
(-0.49) (-1.62) (-2.21) (-3.61) (-3.41) (-2.21) (-1.65)
SA × Long Position 1.41% 0.59% 1.21% 3.83% 2.15% 1.52% 1.66%
(1.58) (0.69) (1.24) (3.91) (2.30) (1.67) (1.77)
Media 1.45% 0.94% 2.41% 2.14% 2.23% 1.18% 0.29%
(1.39) (0.90) (2.37) (2.29) (2.37) (1.19) (0.29)
Media × Percent Negative -0.15% -0.01% -0.19% -0.37% -0.82% -0.56% -0.60%
(-0.69) (-0.03) (-0.87) (-1.84) (-3.84) (-2.43) (-2.62)
Media × Percent Positive -0.47% -0.06% -0.30% 0.12% 0.05% -0.36% 0.32%
(-2.29) (-0.32) (-1.48) (0.65) (0.27) (-1.77) (1.55)
IBES 1.51% 2.61% 2.27% 1.00% 1.65% 1.14% 1.67%
(2.80) (4.39) (4.09) (2.06) (3.34) (2.10) (3.38)
IBES × Long 1.83% -1.96% -0.29% 2.59% 1.63% 0.87% -0.62%
(1.86) (-2.04) (-0.31) (2.73) (1.69) (0.89) (-0.65)
IBES × Short 1.38% 0.16% 0.75% 0.86% -1.89% -0.52% -0.51%
(1.44) (0.16) (0.74) (0.93) (-1.98) (-0.54) (-0.52)
Institutional OIB 8.90% 8.90% 8.69% 8.64% 9.11% 8.85% 8.76%
(40.20) (38.99) (37.99) (38.63) (40.32) (39.21) (37.67)
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Time Time Time Time Time Time Time
R-squared 2.24 2.24 2.21 2.19 2.23 2.25 2.21
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Table 2.5: The Informativeness of Retail Trading following Seeking Alpha Research
This table reports results from the panel regression:
Retit,t+x = α + β1RetailOIBit + β2InstOIBit + β3SAit + β4RetailOIB × SAit
+ β5InstOIBit × SAit + β6Mediait + β7RetailOIB ×Mediait
+ β8InstOIB ×Mediait + β9IBESit + β10RetailOIB × IBESit
+ β11InstOIB × IBESit + β13Chariy−1 + Timet + it
Retit,t+x is the return on the stock from the close of day t to the close of day
t+x. Retail OIBit is the total retail buy volume less total retail sell volume, scaled by
total retail trading volume for stock i on day t, and Inst OIB is defined analogously.
SAit is a dummy variable equal to one if a research report on firm i was published
on Seeking Alpha on day t or t-1, and IBES and Media are defined analogously.
RetailOIBit×SAit is an interaction terms that captures the incremental informative-
ness of retail order imbalances following Seeking Alpha articles. Chars is a vector of
firm characteristics described in the Appendix. All continuous variables are standard-
ized and all regressions include time (calendar day) fixed effects. Standard errors are
double clustered by date and firm, and t-statistics are reported below each estimate.
The sample spans 2007-2017 and is comprised of 4,102,574 firm-day observations.
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Table 2.5, continued
Holding Period
[1] [1,5] [1,10]
Retail OIB 0.02% 0.06% 0.09%
(10.85) (12.80) (10.60)
Institutional OIB -0.04% -0.04% -0.03%
(-9.88) (-4.93) (-2.92)
SA 0.02% 0.04% 0.04%
(2.26) (1.28) (0.71)
Retail OIB × SA 0.04% 0.04% 0.09%
(4.19) (1.49) (2.58)
Institutional OIB × SA 0.02% 0.02% -0.01%
(2.02) (0.62) (-0.13)
Media -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
(-1.38) (-0.29) (-0.15)
Retail OIB × Media 0.02% 0.04% 0.03%
(1.24) (1.24) (0.85)
Institutional OIB × Media 0.07% 0.11% 0.09%
(4.31) (3.21) (2.40)
IBES -0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
(-1.05) (-0.08) (0.12)
Retail OIB × IBES 0.00% 0.00% -0.02%
(-0.24) (-0.31) (-0.90)
Institutional OIB × IBES 0.02% 0.01% 0.04%
(2.25) (0.54) (1.96)
Retw-1 -0.02% -0.09% -0.12%
(-4.01) (-3.77) (-3.31)
Retm-1 -0.01% -0.04% -0.04%
(-1.87) (-1.23) (-0.72)
Retm-7,m-2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
(-0.50) (-0.10) (0.04)
Turnoverm-1 -0.01% -0.06% -0.12%
(-2.37) (-2.27) (-2.52)
Volatilitym-1 0.01% 0.06% 0.09%
(1.84) (1.50) (1.22)
Log (Size) 0.00% -0.01% -0.01%
(-0.62) (-0.32) (-0.24)
Log (BM) 0.00% 0.01% 0.03%
(0.39) (0.50) (0.52)
Fixed Effects Time Time Time
R-squared 16.59% 15.81% 15.24%
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Table 2.6: Retail Trading Informativeness Following Seeking Alpha Research: Size
and Contributor Skill
The table repeats the analysis in Table 5 after partitioning the sample based on firm
size and contributor skill. In Panel A, the sample is split into Small and Large firms
based on median market capitalization at the end of the previous year. In Panel B,
the research article sample is split into High and Low Skill contributors based on the
median average two-day absolute market-adjusted return across the last five articles
written by the contributor. Standard errors are double clustered by date and firm,
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The sample spans
2007-2017
Coefficient on Retail OIB×SA
Panel A: Firm Size
Holding Period:
[1] [1,5] [1,10]
Small Firms 0.09% 0.10% 0.17%
(4.49) (2.33) (2.78)
Large Firms 0.01% -0.01% 0.04%
(0.56) (-0.42) (1.08)
Difference in Coefficients 0.08% 0.12% 0.14%
(3.62) (2.10) (1.95)
Panel B: Contributor Skill
Holding Period:
[1] [1,5] [1,10]
High Skill 0.11% 0.14% 0.25%
(4.22) (2.70) (2.77)
Low Skill 0.01% -0.08% -0.07%
(0.71) (-1.87) (-1.24)
Difference in Coefficients 0.09% 0.22% 0.32%
(3.05) (3.33) (2.91)
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Table 2.7: Departing Seeking Alpha Contributors: Validity Tests
The table reports the effects of departing Seeking Alpha contributors on research
coverage. Firms experience Contributor Departure if at least 20% of the firm’s ex-
isting contributors depart Seeking Alpha in the previous year. Control firms are
firms with no departing Seeking Alpha contributors. Panel A reports univariate
statistics for coverage and firm characteristics. SA Coverage is the total number of
unique Seeking Alpha contributors writing at least one article for the stock during
the calendar year, and ∆Log (SA Coverage) is defined as Log(1+SA Coverageit)–
Log(1+SA Coverageit-1). Panel B presents the estimates from regressing measures
of changes in different measures of research Coverage on a Contributor Departure
indicator variable. We include as controls a number of firm characteristics described
in the appendix. The regressions also include time × style fixed effects, where the
style dummies capture the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios, which effectively
matches treated firms to control firms in the same year and size and book-to-market
quintiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm and time, and t-statistics are reported
in parentheses below each estimate. The sample covers 2005-2017.
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Table 2.7, continued
Coefficient on Retail OIB×SA
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Control Firms and Contributor Departure Firms
Observations
Percent Change
Coverage
Log (Size) Log (MB)
Control Firms 8,408 14.06% 13.60 0.78
Contributor Departure Firms 1,900 -19.61% 14.50 1.07
Panel B: Regression of Changes in Coverage on Contributor Departure
∆ Log SA
Coverage
∆ (Log Non
-Depart SA
Coverage)
∆ (Log
IBES
Coverage)
∆ (Log
Media
Coverage)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Contributor Departure -35.40% 6.31% -0.22% 4.02%
(-16.15) (2.60) (-0.59) (1.33)
∆ (Log Non-Depart. SA Coverage) 1.44% 4.94%
(6.57) (3.79)
∆ (Log IBES Coverage ) 9.50% 9.63% (0.01)
(5.70) (5.70) (0.36)
∆ (Log Media Coverage ) 11.18% 10.85% 0.22%
(7.69) (7.30) (0.36)
Log (Size) 1.90% 0.57% 9.85% 12.38%
(0.74) (0.21) (6.03) (3.13)
Log (BM) -3.10% -3.09% -0.21% -0.58%
(-2.22) (-2.19) (-0.20) (-0.77)
Inst Ownership 0.18% 0.78% 1.40% -1.56%
(0.12) (0.49) (3.43) (-1.50)
Log (Breadth of Ownership) 0.65% 0.67% -1.01% 1.15%
(0.97) (0.92) (-4.93) (1.48)
Log (Vol) 1.09% 0.77% 1.74% 4.44%
(0.65) (0.46) (2.61) (2.48)
Log (Turn) -2.54% -3.04% 3.98% -1.03%
(-1.82) (-1.96) (2.66) (-1.68)
Return 1.78% 1.79% 1.82% 0.11%
(2.01) (1.95) (5.41) (0.21)
Profitability 1.57% 1.51% 0.19% 0.28%
(1.47) (1.39) (0.45) (0.41)
Log (IBES Coverage) 2.93% 3.08% -16.65% 1.43%
(3.03) (3.74) (-9.73) (1.06)
Log (Media Coverage) 4.52% 3.66% 0.07% -21.58%
(3.58) (3.19) (0.13) (-5.08)
Fixed Effects
Time
×Style
T ime
×Style
T ime
×Style
T ime
×Style
Total R-squared 16.01% 12.23% 18.21% 29.30%
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Table 2.8: Departing Seeking Alpha Contributors: Effects on Firm Liquidity
The table reports the results from the following panel regression:
∆Illiquidityit = α + β1ContributorDepartureit
+ β2∆Log(Non−DepartingSACoverageit)
+ β3∆Log(IBESCoverageit) + β4∆Log(MediaCoverage)
+ βChar + Time× Styleit + it.
where Illiquidit is the percentage bid-ask spread (Bid-Ask) in Specifications 1 and
2 and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (Amihud) in Specifications 3 and 4, both
measured in natural logs. Both measures are calculated monthly using daily averages;
change is defined as Illiquidit - Illiquidit-12. Firm i experiences contributor departure
(ContrDepartit) if at least 20% of its existing contributors depart Seeking Alpha (i.e.
issue research for at least five stocks in the calendar year prior to month t, and for
no stocks in calendar year 0 onwards). Non-Depart SA Covit (IBESCovit) denotes
the number of unique non-departing Seeking Alpha contributors (brokerage firms in
IBES) that issue at least one research report research for the stock during calendar
year t. Chars denotes a vector of firm characteristics that is defined in the Appendix.
Each regression includes time×style fixed effects (Tm×Styleit) based on the 25 size
and book-to-market portfolios. Standard errors are clustered by firm and month, and
t-statistics are reported below each estimate. The sample period spans 2005-2017
and is comprised of 123,645 firm-month observations.
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Table 2.8, continued
∆ Log (Bid-Ask) ∆ Log (Amihud)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Contributor Departure 3.45% 2.15% 7.51% 5.15%
(2.98) (2.47) (7.02) (5.72)
Log (Size) -7.82% -16.17%
(-1.87) (-3.69)
Log (BM) 1.28% 1.86%
(1.57) (1.09)
Institutional Ownership -0.42% -4.71%
(-0.46) (-3.07)
Log (Breadth of Ownership) 0.04% -0.16%
(0.12) (-0.28)
Log (Vol) -5.68% -16.09%
(-2.79) (-4.08)
Log (Turnover) 6.06% 20.95%
(6.57) (10.00)
Return -13.95% -27.62%
(-10.57) (-10.56)
Profitability -0.45% -1.74%
(-0.69) (-2.17)
Log (IBES Coverage) 3.54% -0.38%
(2.59) (-0.25)
∆ (Log Non-Departing SA Coverage ) 0.54% 0.63%
(0.72) (0.80)
∆ (Log IBES Coverage ) -1.95% -7.73%
(-3.43) (-7.05)
∆ (Log Media Coverage ) -11.77% -28.02%
(-3.91) (-6.48)
Fixed Effects
Time
×Style
T ime
×Style
T ime
×Style
T ime
×Style
R-squared 19.92% 27.86% 22.54% 34.60%
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Table 2.9: Departing Seeking Alpha Contributors and Liquidity: Ownership, Size,
and Contributor Skill
The table repeats the analysis in Table 8 after partitioning the sample based on
institutional ownership, firm size, and contributor skill. In Panel A (B), the sample
of firms is split into High and Low Institutional Ownership (Size) using the median
value at the end of the previous year. In Panel C, the sample split is based on
whether the fraction of departing contributors with high skill is greater than 50%.
Contributor skill is measured as the average two-day market-adjusted return across
the last five articles written by the contributor. For each partition, we estimate the
panel regression:
∆Illiquidityit = α + β1ContributorDepartureit
+ β2∆Log(Non−DepartingSACoverageit)
+ β3∆Log(IBESCoverageit) + β4∆Log(MediaCoverage)
+ βChars+ Time× Styleit + it.
where Illiquidit is the percentage bid-ask spread (Bid-Ask) or the Amihud (2002) illiq-
uidity ratio (Amihud), both measured in natural logs. The illiquidity measures are
calculated monthly using daily averages, and ∆Illiquidit is the illiquidity measure in
month t less the measure in month t-12. Firms are classified as experiencing contrib-
utor departure (ContrDepartit) if at least 20% of firm i ’s existing contributors depart
Seeking Alpha (i.e. issue research for at least five stocks in calendar years -3 through
-1 before month t, and for no stocks in calendar year 0 onwards). Non-DepartSACovit
(IBESCovit) denotes the number of unique non-departing Seeking Alpha contributors
(brokerage firms in IBES) that issue at least one research report research for stock
during calendar year 0. Chars denotes a vector of firm characteristics that is defined
in the Appendix. Each regression includes time×style fixed effects (Tm×Style it)
based on the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios. Standard errors are clustered by
firm and time, and t-statistics are reported below each estimate. The sample period
spans 2005-2017 and is comprised of 123,645 firm-month observations.
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Table 2.9, continued
Coefficient on Contributor Departure
Panel A: Sorts on Institutional Ownership
∆ Log (Bid-Ask) ∆ Log (Amihud)
Low Institutional Ownership 5.26 12.27
(3.08) (5.40)
High Institutional Ownership -0.06 -0.25
(-0.07) (-0.27)
Difference in Coefficients 5.32 12.52
(2.68) (4.35)
Panel B: Sorts on Firm Size
∆ Log (Bid-Ask) ∆ Log (Amihud)
Small Firms 3.95 9.28
(1.67) (4.99)
Large Firm 0.60 0.95
(0.46) (0.94)
Difference in Coefficients 3.35 8.33
(1.04) (3.47)
Panel C: Sorts on Departing Contributor Skill
∆ Log (Bid-Ask) ∆ Log (Amihud)
High Skill 3.95 7.25
(3.54) (5.21)
Low Skill 0.61 3.43
(0.66) (3.19)
Difference in Coefficients 3.34 3.82
(2.26) (1.90)
Copyright c© Michael Farrell, 2019.
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions for Chapter 1
• Fitness – The fitness represents how closely the modeled portfolio replicates the
daily returns of the actual fund. It is the result from minimizing equation 1.18:
min
k1...kN ,%Cash
T∑
t=1
( Rt,F,reported
(1−%Cash) −
N∑
i=1
Ri,t × Si,k,t−1 × Pi,t−1∑N
i=1 Si,k,t−1 × Pi,t−1
)2
+ 0.01Vt
 .
• flowt – The net flows to the mutual fund in quarter t, scaled by total net assets.
• Mom1&5 – For each stock, I take the average returns over the past 1 and 5 days.
For each fund quarter, I calculate the principle-weighted average Mom1&5 of
stocks purchased minus stocks sold, with respect to the date on which each
transaction is made. This measure is computed only within the Ancerno sample.
• Mom1&5calc – This measure is analogous to Mom1&5, except that the dates
on which the trades take place are first estimated using the fund’s quarterly
holdings and daily returns.
• Mom1&5end – This measure is analogous to Mom1&5, except that the dates
on which the trades are assumed to take place on the final day of the quarter.
• Mom1&5Q – This measure is formed by taking each stock’s average Mom1&5
throughout the quarter and computing the principle-weighted average of stocks
purchased minus stocks sold.
• Mom1&5smooth – This measure is analogous to Mom1&5, except that the quar-
terly trades are assumed to take place in equal quantities each day within the
quater.
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions for Chapter 2
B.1 Seeking Alpha Variables
• SA Coverage – the number of unique Seeking Alpha contributors writing an
opinion article for a firm during the calendar year (Source: Seeking Alpha).
• SA Articles – the total number of Seeking Alpha opinion articles written for a
firm during the calendar year (Source: Seeking Alpha).
• Contributor Departure – an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has lost
20% or more of its existing coverage due to plausibly exogenous departures from
Seeking Alpha. (Source: Seeking Alpha).
– We consider dropped coverage for firm i in year t to be plausibly exogenous
if 1) the departing contributor was covering at least five firms (including
firm i) in year t-1 and 2) the contributor never issues research for any
firms on Seeking Alpha at any point after year t-1.
• Non-Departing SA Coverage – defined as SA Coverage less the total number of
contributors who dropped coverage due to plausible exogenous departures (as
defined above).
• SA – a dummy variable equal to one if a Seeking Alpha opinion article was
written about firm i on day t or day t-1 (Source: Seeking Alpha).
• Percent Negative (Positive) – the average fraction of negative (positive) words
across all single-ticker articles published on Seeking Alpha about firm i on day
t. (Source: Seeking Alpha). The list of negative and positive words is taken
from Loughran and McDonald (2011).
• Short (Long) Position – a dummy variable equal to one if the author discloses a
short (long) position about the company discussed in the article. This measure
is average across all single-ticker articles published about firm i on day t.
• Contributor Skill – the two day absolute market-adjusted return averaged across
the past five articles written by the contributor. (Source: Seeking Alpha/CRSP).
B.2 Liquidity Measures
• Retail Turnover – average daily retail turnover (i.e., retail share volume scaled
by shares outstanding) during the calendar year. Retail trading is classified
using the approach outlined in Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017). (Source:
TAQ and CRSP).
• Percent Retail Turnover – retail share volume scaled by total share volume.
Retail trading is classified using the approach outlined in Boehmer, Jones, and
Zhang (2017). (Source: TAQ and CRSP).
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• Amihud - the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure computed using all daily data
available in the calendar year.
• Bid-Ask Spread – the average daily bid-ask spread computed as the difference
between the (end of day) bid and ask price, divided by the midpoint. Winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. (Source: CRSP).
B.3 Other Variables:
• Size – the market capitalization computed as share prices times total shares
outstanding at the end of the year (Source: CRSP).
• Book-to-Market (BM) – the book-to-market ratio computed as the book value
of equity during the calendar year scaled by the market capitalization at the
end of the calendar year. Negative values are deleted and positive values are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. (Source: CRSP/Compustat).
• Volatility – the standard deviation of daily returns during the calendar year
(Source: CRSP).
• Age – the number of years since the Initial Public Offering (Source: Compustat).
• Profitability – EBITDA scaled by book value of assets. Winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles (Source: Compustat).
• Returnt-1, t-12 – the buy-and-hold gross return over the prior 12 months. Alter-
native holding periods are labelled analogously (Source: CRSP).
• Institutional Ownership – the percentage of the firm’s shares held by institutions
at year end (Source: Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings S34).
• Retail Ownership – 1 – Institutional Ownership.
• Breadth of Ownership – the total number of common shareholders (Source:
Compustat).
• IBES Coverage – the number of unique brokerage houses issuing an earnings
forecast for a firm during the calendar year (Source: IBES).
• Media Coverage – the total number of media articles about a firm during the
calendar year (Source: Factiva and Chen et al., 2014)).
• IBES – an indicator variable equal to one if an IBES earnings forecast or IBES
investment recommendation was issued for a firm on day t or day t-1 (Source:
IBES).
• Media – an indicator variable equal to one if a Media article was issued for a
firm on day t or day t-1. (Source: Factiva and Chen et al., 2014).
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• Earnings Event – an indicator variable equal to one if earnings or earnings
guidance is announced for the firm for day t or day t-1 (Source: IBES).
• Retail OIB – retail buy volume less retail sell volume, scaled by total retail trad-
ing volume. Retail trading is classified using the approach outlined in Boehmer,
Jones, and Zhang (2017), and trades are signed using the Lee and Ready (1991)
algorithm (Source: TAQ).
• Institutional OIB – the total (non-retail) share volume bought less the (non-
retail) share volume sold, scaled by the total (non-retail) volume traded. Retail
trading is classified using the approach outlined in Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang
(2017), and trades are signed using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm (Source:
TAQ).
63
Figure B1: The Informativeness of Retail Trading Following Seeking Alpha Research
over Time
Each month, we estimate the following panel regression:
Retit,t+10 = α + β1RetailOIBit + β2InstOIBit + β3SAit + β4RetailOIB × SAit
+ β5InstOIBit × SAit + β6Mediait + β7RetailOIB ×Mediait
+ β8InstOIB ×Mediait + β9IBESit + β10RetailOIB × IBESit
+ β11InstOIB × IBESit + β13Chariy−1 + Timet + it
(7)
The regression is identical to Specification 3 of Table 5 except that the regression
is estimated separately each month. The figure plots the cumulative coefficient on
Retail OIB * SA over the full-sample period.
64
References
Asthana, Balsam S., S., and S. Sankaraguruswamy, 2004, Differential response of
small versus large investors to 10-k filings on edgar., The Accounting Review 79,
571–589.
Avery, Chevalier J., C., and R. Zeckhauser, 2016, The “caps” prediction system and
stock market returns., Review of Finance 20, 1363–1381.
Barber, B., and T. Odean, 2000, Trading is hazardous to your wealth: The common
stock investment performance of individual investors., Journal of Finance 55, 773–
806.
Barber, B., and T. Odean, 2002, Online investors: Do the slow die first?, Review of
Financial Studies 15, 455–488.
Barber, B., and T. Odean, 2013, The behavior of individual investors., Handbook of
the Economics of Finance, Elsevier 2, 1533–1570.
Barber, Odean T., B., and N. Zhu, 2009, Do retail trades move markets?, Review of
Financial Studies 22, 151–186.
Barclay, Michael J, and Jerold B Warner, 1993, Stealth trading and volatility: Which
trades move prices?, Journal of Financial Economics 34, 281–305.
Battalio, Corwin S., R., and R. Jennings, 2016, Can brokers have it all? on the rela-
tion between make-take fees and limit order execution quality., Journal of Finance
71, 2913–2238.
Bergstra, James, and Yoshua Bengio, 2012, Random search for hyper-parameter op-
timization, Journal of Machine Learning Research 13, 281–305.
Bhattacharya, Cho Y., N., and J. Kim, 2018, Levelling the playing field between large
and small institutions: evidence from the sec’s xbrl mandate., Accounting Review
forthcoming.
Bhushan, R., 1989, Firm characteristics and analyst following., Journal of Accounting
and Economics 11, 255–274.
Blankespoor, Miller B., E., and H. White, 2014, Initial evidence on the market impact
of the xbrl mandate., Review of Accounting Studies 19, 1468–1503.
Boehmer, Jones C., E., and X. Zhang, 2017, Tracking retail investor activity, Working
paper.
Brown, Call A. Clement M., L., and N. Sharp, 2015, Inside the “black box” of sell-side
financial analysts., Journal of Accounting Research 53, Jan–47.
65
Campbell, DeAngelis M., J., and J. Moon, 2016, Skin in the game: Personal stock
holdings and investors’ response to stock analysis on social media, Working paper.
Campbell, John Y, Tarun Ramadorai, and Allie Schwartz, 2009, Caught on tape:
Institutional trading, stock returns, and earnings announcements, Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics 92, 66–91.
Carhart, Mark M, 1997, On persistence in mutual fund performance, The Journal of
Finance 52, 57–82.
Chen, De P. Hu J., H., and B.H. Hwang, 2014, Wisdom of the crowds: The value of
stock opinions transmitted through social media., Review of Financial Studies 27,
1367–1403.
Chordia, Tarun, 1996, The structure of mutual fund charges, Journal of Financial
Economics 41, 3–39.
Cohen, Lauren, Dong Lou, and Christopher J Malloy, 2016, Cloaked trading, Journal
of Investment Consulting 17, 69–80.
Corrie Driebusch, Gregory Zuckerman, Alexander Osipovich, 2018, What’s the
biggest trade on the new york stock exchange? the last one, Wall Street Jour-
nal, March 14 .
Coval, Joshua, and Erik Stafford, 2007, Asset fire sales (and purchases) in equity
markets, Journal of Financial Economics 86, 479–512.
Daniel, Grinblatt M. Titman S., K., and R. Wermers, 1997, Measuring mutual fund
performance with characteristic-based benchmarks., Journal of Finance 52, 1035–
1058.
Daniel, Kent, Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman, and Russ Wermers, 1997, Measuring
mutual fund performance with characteristic-based benchmarks, The Journal of
finance 52, 1035–1058.
Del Guercio, Diane, and Paula A Tkac, 2002, The determinants of the flow of funds
of managed portfolios: Mutual funds vs. pension funds, Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 37, 523–557.
Duarte, Han X. Harford J., J., and L. Young, 2008, Information asymmetry, informa-
tion dissemination, and the effect of regulation fd, Journal of Financial Economics
87, 24–44.
Eleswarapu, Thomspon R., V., and K. Venkataraman, 2004, The impact of regulation
fair disclosure: Trading costs and information asymmetry., Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis 39, 209–225.
Fama, Eugene F, and Kenneth R French, 2010, Luck versus skill in the cross-section
of mutual fund returns, The journal of finance 65, 1915–1947.
66
Fama, Eugene F, and James D MacBeth, 1973, Risk, return, and equilibrium: Em-
pirical tests, Journal of political economy 81, 607–636.
Franzoni, Francesco, and Alberto Plazzi, 2013, Do hedge funds provide liquidity?
evidence from their trades, Working paper. University of Lugano and Swiss Finance
Institute.
Frazzini, A., and O. Lamont, 2008, Dumb money: Mutual fund flows and the cross-
section of stock returns., Journal of Financial Economics 88, 299–322.
Green, Jame R. Markov S., T.C., and M. Subasi, 2014, Broker-hosted investor con-
ferences., Journal of Accounting and Economics 58, 142–166.
Grennan, J., and R. Michaely, 2018, Fintechs and the market for financial analysis,
Working paper.
Ha, JinGi, and Jianfeng Hu, 2017, How smart is institutional trading?, Working
Paper.
Huang, J., and M. Gao, 2018, Informing the market: the effect of modern information
technologies on information production, Working paper.
Hvidkjaer, S., 2008, Small trades and the cross-section of stock returns., Review of
Financial Studies 21, 1123–1151.
Ivkovic´, Zoran, and Scott Weisbenner, 2009, Individual investor mutual fund flows,
Journal of Financial Economics 92, 223–237.
Jame, Johnston R. Markov S., R., and M. Wolfe, 2016, The value of crowdsourced
earnings forecasts., Journal of Accounting Research 54, 1077–1110.
Jame, Russell, 2018, Liquidity provision and the cross section of hedge fund returns,
Management Science 64, 3288.
Jordan, Bradford, and Timothy Riley, 2016, Skill and persistence in mutual fund
returns: Evidence from a six-factor model, Working Paper.
Jylha¨, Petri, Kalle Rinne, and Matti Suominen, 2014, Do hedge funds supply or
demand liquidity?, Review of Finance 18, 1259–1298.
Kacperczyk, Marcin, Clemens Sialm, and Lu Zheng, 2006, Unobserved actions of
mutual funds, The Review of Financial Studies 21, 2379–2416.
Kaniel, Liu S. Saar G., R., and S. Titman, 2012, Individual investor trading and
return patterns around earnings announcements, Journal of Finance 67, 639–680.
Kaniel, Saar G., R., and S. Titman, 2008, Individual investor sentiment and stock
returns., Journal of Finance 63, 273–310.
Kelley, E., and P. Tetlock, 2013, How wise are crowds? insights from retail orders
and stocks returns., Journal of Finance 68, 1229–1265.
67
Kelley, E., and P. Tetlock, 2017, Retail short-selling and stock prices., Review of
Financial Studies 30, 801–834.
Kelly, B., and A. Ljungqvist, 2012, Testing asymmetric-information asset pricing
models., Review of Financial Studies 25, 1366–1413.
Kumar, A., and C. Lee, 2006, Retail investor sentiment and return comovements.,
Journal of Finance 61, 2451–2486.
Loughran, T., and B. McDonald, 2011, When is a liability not a liability? textual
analysis, dictionaries, and 10-ks., Journal of Finance 66, 35–65.
McCall, John, 2004, Genetic algorithms for modelling and optimisation, Journal of
Computational and Applied Mathematics 184, 205–222.
Nagel, Stefan, 2012, Evaporating liquidity, The Review of Financial Studies 25, 2005–
2039.
Newey, Whitney K, and Kenneth D West, 1987, Hypothesis testing with efficient
method of moments estimation, International Economic Review 777–787.
Petersen, Mitchell A, 2009, Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets:
Comparing approaches, The Review of Financial Studies 22, 435–480.
Puckett, Andy, and Xuemin Sterling Yan, 2011, The interim trading skills of institu-
tional investors, The Journal of Finance 66, 601–633.
Rinne, Kalle, and Matti Suominen, 2014, Mutual funds’ returns from providing liq-
uidity and costs of immediacy, Working Paper.
Seru, A., T. Shumway, and N. Stoffman, 2009, Learning by trading., Review of Fi-
nancial Studies 23, 705–739.
Sharpe, William F., 1992, Asset allocation: Management style and performance mea-
surement, The Journal of Portfolio Management 18, 7–19.
Sirri, Erik R, and Peter Tufano, 1998, Costly search and mutual fund flows, The
journal of finance 53, 1589–1622.
Spiess, Andrej-Nikolai, and Natalie Neumeyer, 2010, An evaluation of r2 as an inad-
equate measure for nonlinear models in pharmacological and biochemical research:
a monte carlo approach, BMC Pharmacology 10, 6.
Tetlock, P., 2007, Giving content to investment sentiment: The role of media in the
stock market., Journal of Finance 62, 1139–1168.
White, Halbert, 1980, A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator
and a direct test for heteroskedasticity, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society 817–838.
68
Yan, Xuemin, 2006, The determinants and implications of mutual fund cash holdings:
Theory and evidence, Financial Management 35, 67–91.
Yeniay, O¨zgu¨r, 2005, Penalty function methods for constrained optimization with
genetic algorithms, Mathematical and computational Applications 10, 45–56.
Zheng, Lu, 1999, Is money smart? a study of mutual fund investors’ fund selection
ability, the Journal of Finance 54, 901–933.
Zhu, C., 2018, Big data as a governance mechanism, Review of Financial Studies
forthcoming.
69
Vita
Michael Farrell
EDUCATION
Concordia University
MSc. Finance 2014
McGill University
B.A. Economics 2009
WORKING PAPERS
“Read Between the Filings: Daily Mutual Fund Holdings and Liquidity Provision”
• Presented at FMA Doctoral Consortium (2018), EFA (2019), Sacred Heart
University, Elon University, SUNY Albany, Saint Joseph’s University, Seton
Hall University, and Manhattan College.
“The Democratization of Investment Research: Implications for Retail Investor Prof-
itability and Firm Liquidity” (with T. Clifton Green, Russell Jame, and Stanimir
Markov)
• Presented at the Hawaii Accounting Research Conference (HARC 2019),* Fi-
nancial Accounting and Reporting Section Midyear Meeting (FARS 2019),*
Smokey Mountain Finance Conference (2019),* Midwest Finance Association
(MFA 2019), Western Finance Association (WFA 2019)*, and SFS Cavalcade
(2019).*
(* indicates presentations by coauthor)
TEACHING
University of Kentucky
Introduction to Corporate Finance
Summer 2017. Average Rating 4.85/5.0
Investment Analysis
Summer 2016. Average Rating 4.54/5.0
70
FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS
University of Kentucky
2017-2019 Gatton Fellowship
2014-2017 Luckett Fellowship
2016 Outstanding Graduate Assistant Award
2014–2015 Max Steckler Award
2013 MSc Best Research Presentation
2012 Scotiabank M.Sc. Fellowship in Finance
Professional Activities
2019 Discussant and Session Chair at EFA Conference
2019 Referee for Pacific Basin Journal of Finance
2019 Discussant at MFA Conference
2018 FMA Doctoral Consortium Participant
2018 Referee for Managerial Finance
2016 Session Chair FMA Conference
2015-2016 Discussant at FMA Conference
71
